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JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND THE 
UNREASONABLE VIEWS OF THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 
Beth Stephens* 
INTRODUCTION 
.S. courts have long held that executive branch views about a law-
suit’s potential impact on foreign affairs are entitled to deference. 
Although the courts have emphasized that executive branch views are not 
binding, they rarely rejected them prior to the presidency of George W. 
Bush. This historically deferential approach took a dramatic turn during 
the Bush administration, when the executive branch informed the courts 
that a series of human rights cases against corporate defendants threat-
ened U.S. foreign policy interests. Remarkably, the courts permitted 
most of the claims to proceed despite the administration’s concerns. 
These highly contested human rights cases were filed under the juris-
diction of the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”),1 which authorizes plaintiffs to 
seek civil remedies for egregious violations of international law.2 The 
Bush administration adamantly opposed all ATS litigation as an interfer-
ence in the foreign affairs powers of the executive branch. After losing a 
broad challenge to the interpretation of the ATS in the Supreme Court in 
2004,3 the administration filed repeated submissions in corporate-
defendant ATS cases, arguing that judicial involvement interferes with 
foreign policy. 
Approximately fifty ATS cases have been filed against corporate de-
fendants since a key 1996 decision upheld the concept of ATS corporate 
liability.4 The Bush administration filed letters or amicus briefs in ten of 
                                                                                                             
 *  Professor, Rutgers-Camden Law School. I have participated in several of the hu-
man rights lawsuits discussed in this Article as counsel for plaintiffs, through amicus 
briefs, or as a consultant. Special thanks to my research assistant, Kathryn Buben, Rut-
gers-Camden 2008. 
 1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
 2. For an overview of ATS litigation in general, see infra Part I.A and Appendix A. 
 3. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (holding that the ATS grants fed-
eral courts jurisdiction over claims for widely accepted, clearly defined violations of 
international law). 
 4. For a discussion of the first corporate-defendant decision, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 
963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), see Part I.B. This total does not include cases alleging 
claims arising out of World War II. Over half of the post-Unocal, non–World War II 
corporate-defendant cases have been dismissed. Three settled, one ended with a jury ver-
dict for the plaintiff, and one ended with a jury verdict for the defendant. Fifteen are cur-
rently pending in the district courts and another nine are pending on appeal. For a list of 
ATS corporate-defendant cases and their current status, see Appendix B. 
U 
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those cases,5 stating that the litigation could undermine important U.S. 
foreign policy interests, including national security. Prior to the Bush 
administration, courts dismissed most, if not all cases in which an ad-
ministration filed a comparable objection. Of the eight ATS corporate-
defendant cases in which the courts reached the issues raised by the Bush 
administration,6 however, they accepted the administration’s foreign pol-
icy concerns in only two, allowing five to proceed and dismissing one on 
other grounds after expressly rejecting the administration’s arguments.7 
Moreover, one of the two cases in which the foreign policy concerns 
were accepted involved a contractor working with the U.S. government, 
a situation that is typically even more likely to trigger deference, and the 
other decision is still pending on appeal.8 This remarkable record is even 
more striking given that all of these cases were decided during the era of 
heightened concern about national security that followed the attacks of 
September 11, 2001. 
The traditional standard of judicial deference to executive branch for-
eign policy concerns varies according to the underlying issue.9 The 
courts have held that some determinations are constitutionally committed 
                                                                                                             
 5. For a detailed review of the ten submissions, see Appendix C. In an eleventh case, 
Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., Inc., in response to a request from the district 
court, the State Department submitted a letter stating that it did not have an opinion at 
that time as to whether the litigation would have an adverse impact on U.S. foreign policy 
interests. Letter from John B. Bellinger, Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State, at 2, Romero v. 
Drummond, No. 03-0575 (Aug. 2, 2006). In two additional cases, executive branch sub-
missions stated that the “state secrets” doctrine barred litigation of claims that private 
corporations had participated in the government’s abuse and/or illegal rendition of secret 
detainees. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 301 (4th Cir. 2007); Memoran-
dum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for 
Summary Judgment by the United States, at 22–23, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 
No. 07-2798 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2007), 2007 WL 3223297. 
 6. In Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., No. 03-417580 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 
20, 2003), filed in state court in California, the judge has not yet responded to the narrow 
issue raised by the executive branch submission. See infra note 118. In another case, Doe 
v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880, the parties settled before the court resolved the issues raised 
by the executive branch. For an explanation of the complicated history of the Unocal 
litigation, see infra note 32. 
 7. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 
517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008) (dismissing a suit by Vietnamese victims of herbicides used 
by the U.S. government during the Vietnam War after finding that the alleged actions did 
not violate international law norms recognized at that time). See discussion infra Part IV. 
B. 
 8. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (involving a U.S.-
government-approved contract to sell bulldozers to Israel); Mujica v. Occidental Petro-
leum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal 2005). 
 9. See infra Part II. 
2008] JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 775 
to the executive branch, including, for instance, whether a foreign gov-
ernment official is entitled to diplomatic immunity. On those issues, the 
courts follow the views of the executive branch with little or no scrutiny. 
In areas constitutionally assigned to the judiciary, however, such as statu-
tory interpretation, courts do not defer. 
Between these two extremes, difficult deference questions often arise 
when a court considers whether it should refrain from deciding a case 
otherwise properly within its jurisdiction because the executive branch 
claims that judicial resolution will interfere with foreign policy.10 The 
courts often defer to such opinions, but stress that they are not bound to 
follow those views. The courts have not, however, clearly articulated a 
standard to guide their evaluation of the deference due to executive 
branch submissions. 
In this Article, I derive a standard from the language of past decisions 
that explains, in part, the failings of the recent executive branch submis-
sions. In order to merit deference, an administration submission must: (1) 
articulate the relevant policy interests; (2) explain how the litigation 
could harm those interests; (3) tie the anticipated harm to one of the rec-
ognized foreign policy justiciability doctrines; and finally, (4) offer ex-
planations that are reasonable, drawing conclusions that are well-founded 
and supported by the facts. The Bush administration corporate-defendant 
submissions have failed to satisfy this basic test. 
I begin in Part I with a history of the ATS and a review of the corpo-
rate-defendant ATS cases. In Part II, I discuss the precedents guiding 
deference to the foreign policy views of the executive branch and then 
articulate a standard that captures what the courts have held about for-
eign policy deference. Part III summarizes prior administration submis-
sions in ATS suits, while Part IV offers a detailed analysis of Bush ad-
ministration submissions in corporate-defendant ATS cases, along with 
the courts’ responses to them. Part V analyzes flaws in the submissions, 
including both exaggerated claims that the cases could have catastrophic 
consequences and faulty economic arguments, that help explain the nega-
tive reception they have received. 
                                                                                                             
 10. These cases are usually decided through application of the political question doc-
trine, the act of state doctrine, or comity. See infra Part II.A. 
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I. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
A. From 1789 through Filártiga and the Post-Filártiga Individual De-
fendant Cases 
The ATS was enacted in 1789 as a section of the First Judiciary Act, 
the statute that established the judicial framework for the newly inaugu-
rated federal government. The ATS reads in full: “The district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”11 Although there are no surviving records of the origins 
of the statute, modern historians have pieced together a likely explana-
tion of its genesis.12 In the period between independence and the drafting 
of the Constitution, the federal government faced several international 
crises in which foreign governments complained vehemently about viola-
tions of the law of nations, particularly attacks on diplomats. Under the 
Articles of Confederation, the federal government had no power to ad-
dress these wrongs, although it bore full responsibility for managing the 
confrontations with the European powers that ensued. The Constitution 
strengthened the foreign affairs powers of the federal government. The 
ATS, enacted by the first Congress, was one of several efforts to codify 
federal supervision over issues impacting foreign relations.13 
Largely overlooked in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
statute regained prominence in 1980, when the Second Circuit relied on 
it in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala.14 Filártiga was filed by the relatives of a 
young man tortured to death in Paraguay after they discovered his Para-
guayan torturer living in New York City. Their civil lawsuit relied on the 
ATS, asserting that torture constituted a “tort . . . in violation of the law 
of nations.”15 The administration of President Jimmy Carter strongly 
supported that view in a joint brief filed by the Departments of State and 
Justice.16 The Second Circuit agreed, holding that “deliberate torture per-
petrated under color of official authority violates universally accepted 
norms of the international law of human rights” and therefore triggers 
federal court jurisdiction under the ATS.17 
                                                                                                             
 11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); see also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73. 
 12. This history was summarized by the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
542 U.S. 692, 716–20 (2004). 
 13. Id. at 715–17. 
 14. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 15. Id. at 880. 
 16. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12–24, Filártiga v. Peña-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090), 1980 WL 340146. 
 17. 630 F.2d at 878. 
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Although approximately 185 human rights lawsuits have been filed 
since Filártiga, the majority have been dismissed, most often for failure 
to allege a violation of an actionable international norm or because of the 
immunity of the defendants.18 Most of the successful cases involve an 
egregious violation of international norms such as genocide, torture, 
summary execution, disappearance, war crimes, or crimes against hu-
manity. Defendants have included those with command responsibility for 
abuses as well as direct perpetrators. For example, thousands of victims 
of Ferdinand Marcos’ repressive regime in the Philippines won a judg-
ment against Marcos’ estate for torture, executions, and disappearances.19 
A group of indigenous Guatemalans won a judgment against General 
Hector Gramajo for torture and executions.20 Survivors of abuses and 
relatives of deceased victims have filed lawsuits against the former mili-
tary leaders of Argentina, El Salvador, Haiti, and Ethiopia, among oth-
ers.21 
In 2004, the Supreme Court upheld the application of the ATS to mod-
ern human rights litigation in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.22 Sosa involved 
the kidnapping and detention of Humberto Alvarez-Machain, who was 
suspected (but later acquitted) of involvement in the murder of a U.S. 
drug enforcement agent.23 Although the Court rejected Alvarez’s claim 
of arbitrary detention, it upheld ATS jurisdiction over widely accepted, 
clearly defined violations of international law. The Court cited prior ATS 
decisions with approval, noting that their reasoning was “generally con-
sistent” with the approach adopted by Sosa.24 
B. Corporate Defendant ATS Cases 
Until the mid-1990s, ATS cases generally targeted former officials of 
recognized governments who were acting under color of official author-
                                                                                                             
 18. See Appendix A. For a comprehensive analysis of modern human rights litigation; 
see also BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. 
COURTS 12–25 (2d ed. 2008). 
 19. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 20. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995). 
 21. See, e.g., Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2006) (upholding a jury verdict 
against two former military leaders of El Salvador); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 
(11th Cir. 1996) (upholding verdict against Ethiopian military official); Paul v. Avril, 901 
F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (entering judgment against the former head of the military 
government of Haiti); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987), on 
reconsideration 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (denying motion to dismiss an ATS 
suit against a former Argentine general). 
 22. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 23. Id. at 697–98. 
 24. Id. at 732. 
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ity when they committed human rights abuses. In Kadic v. Karadzic, 
filed in 1993, victims of genocidal ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-
Herzegovina sued the leader of the unrecognized Bosnian-Serb regime 
for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, and summary 
execution.25 The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that in-
ternational law applied only to officials of recognized governments.26 
The Second Circuit reversed, stating that non-state actors could be held 
liable for human rights abuses in two circumstances.27 First, the Kadic 
court recognized that some international law violations do not require 
state action.28 The international law definitions of genocide and slavery, 
for example, apply to private actors as well as government officials.29 
Second, the court held that a private party can be held liable for a human 
rights violation that does require state action when it acts in concert with 
a state actor.30 The court pointed to the extensive U.S. jurisprudence on 
“color of law” as a guide for determining when a private actor can be 
held to have acted in concert with a state actor.31 
Although Kadic concerned an individual defendant, its holding applies 
equally to ATS claims against corporate defendants, either when a pri-
vate corporation commits one of the abuses that does not require state 
action or when it acts in concert with government officials to commit a 
violation that does. Doe v. Unocal invoked this theory in its claims 
against a corporation involved in the construction of a gas pipeline across 
Burma.32 Plaintiffs, Burmese villagers, had suffered executions, forced 
                                                                                                             
 25. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 26. Id. at 237. 
 27. Id. at 236. The court also held in the alternative that Karadzic had acted under 
color of law of his de facto regime. Id. at 244–45. 
 28. Id. at 239–44. 
 29. Id. at 239, 241–42; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide art. IV, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 
12, 1951) (“Persons committing genocide . . . shall be punished, whether they are consti-
tutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.”); Slavery Conven-
tion art. I(2), Sept. 25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253 (entered into force Mar. 9, 1927). 
 30. 70 F.3d at 245. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891 (C.D. Cal. 1997). See also Nat’l Coa-
lition Gov’t of Burma v. Unocal Corp., 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (denying motion 
to dismiss); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (granting de-
fendants’ motion for summary judgment), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (reversing summary judgment and remanding for trial), reh’g en banc granted, 
395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003). In December 2004, before a scheduled argument of the 
rehearing en banc, the parties announced a settlement and dismissed all claims. Neither 
side would disclose details of the settlement. Unocal Settles Rights Suit in Myanmar, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at C6. See also Doe v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 
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labor, and torture, including rape. They alleged that Unocal and its part-
ners hired the Burmese military to provide security and other support, 
knowing that the military was likely to commit human rights abuses. The 
district court denied a motion to dismiss, holding that a corporation can 
be held liable for participating in a joint venture with a government that 
commits such abuses. Although the case was later dismissed on a motion 
for summary judgment,33 a panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding 
that a corporation could be held liable for aiding and abetting a human 
rights violation if it provided “knowing practical assistance or encour-
agement which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the 
crime.”34 
Later cases have consistently held that corporations can be held liable 
for human rights abuses through ATS litigation, although some of the 
cases have been dismissed on other grounds.35 The circuit courts and 
most district courts have also agreed that corporations can be held liable 
for aiding and abetting human rights violations.36 However, the courts 
have yet to agree on the proper standard for determining such liability. 
The Unocal panel decision relied on international law to hold that a cor-
porate defendant could be held liable if it provided “knowing practical 
assistance or encouragement which has a substantial effect on the perpe-
tration of the crime.”37 In a concurring opinion, Judge Reinhardt rejected 
the use of international standards and urged that federal common law 
                                                                                                             
2005) (post-settlement order granting the parties’ stipulated motion to dismiss and vacat-
ing the district court decision on the motion for summary judgment). 
 33. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 942–45 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 34. Id. at 951, 947–53 (holding as well that the district court had applied an improp-
erly high standard for corporate aiding and abetting liability). 
 35. See, e.g., Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 
2005) (dismissed as a political question) (appeal pending); Presbyterian Church of Sudan 
v. Talisman Energy Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (motion for summary 
judgment granted) (appeal pending); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. 99-02506, slip op. 
(N.D. Cal. Aug 14, 2007) and Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., No. 03-417580 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. filed Feb. 20, 2003) (claims for events occurring in Nigeria pending in federal 
and state trial courts); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(claims for events in Nigeria pending in district court). 
 36. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), aff’d due 
to lack of a quorum sub nom., American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 2008 WL 
117862, 76 U.S.L.W. 3405 (May 12, 2008) (No. 07-919); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 
F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), reh’g granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007); Aldana v. Del 
Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1247–48 (11th Cir. 2005); Doe v. Uno-
cal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 
2003). For full history of the Unocal case, see supra note 32. But see Doe v. Exxon Mo-
bil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 37. 395 F.3d at 951. 
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standards be applied, although he found that federal common law would 
arrive at a similar standard.38 
More recently, the two judge majority in Khulumani v. Barclay Na-
tional Bank Ltd. agreed that the ATS encompasses aiding and abetting 
claims, but disagreed on both the source and the substance of the stan-
dard.39 Judge Katzmann found that the aiding and abetting standard was 
governed by international law, which he found required a showing that 
the defendant both “provides practical assistance to the principal which 
has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime” and “does so 
with the purpose of facilitating the commission of that crime.”40 In con-
trast, Judge Hall concluded that the standard was governed by federal 
common law.41 Looking at the Restatement (Second) of Torts for guid-
ance, he found that the aiding and abetting standard required knowing, 
substantial assistance to the commission of a violation.42 Thus, both the 
appropriate source of the aiding-and-abetting standard and its content 
remain unresolved. 
The Bush administration submitted its views to the courts in many of 
the corporate-defendant human rights cases, arguing that each case raised 
significant foreign policy concerns. The degree of deference due to those 
views has been a key issue in the litigation. 
II. FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFERENCE 
A. An Overview 
Litigation that touches on foreign affairs raises difficult constitutional 
questions, shaped by two often-contradictory principles. At one extreme, 
as the Supreme Court stated emphatically in Oetjen v. Central Leather 
Company, “[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is 
committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative—‘the po-
litical’— departments of the government.”43 As a result, the courts are 
sensitive to the executive branch’s concerns about the foreign policy im-
plications of pending cases.44 
                                                                                                             
 38. Id. at 970 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
 39. 504 F.3d at 260. 
 40. Id. at 277 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
 41. Id. at 284 (Hall, J., concurring). 
 42. Id. at 288. Judge Hall found that the standard should also include the additional 
Restatement bases for liability: encouraging, contracting, soliciting, or facilitating a viola-
tion. Id. at 288–89. 
 43. 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918). 
 44. The Department of Justice is authorized by statute to submit the executive 
branch’s view of pending litigation to the courts. 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2008). Submissions 
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However, the Court has also repeatedly emphasized that the judiciary 
must exercise independent judgment in cases properly before the courts, 
even if the issues involve foreign affairs. Thus, the Court has stated that, 
“despite the broad statement in Oejten . . . it cannot of course be thought 
that ‘every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies be-
yond judicial cognizance.’”45 In the memorable words of Justice Doug-
las, unquestioning deference to executive branch views in a case impli-
cating foreign affairs would render the court “a mere errand boy for the 
Executive Branch which may choose to pick some people’s chestnuts 
from the fire, but not others’.”46 
The degree of deference afforded to executive branch views depends 
on the subject at issue in the case, and, in particular, on whether that mat-
ter is clearly assigned by the Constitution to one of the branches of gov-
ernment. In a narrow set of cases involving recognition of diplomats, 
heads of states, and foreign governments, executive branch views are 
generally final.47 Courts have found that such decisions require factual 
determinations that are delegated to the president as part of the executive 
branch’s power to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”48 
At the other end of the deference spectrum, the Court has held that the 
Constitution assigns to the courts the interpretation of statutes. As the 
Court said in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, issues of statutory interpre-
tation are “well within the province of the Judiciary”49 and the views of 
the executive branch “merit no special deference.”50 The Court declined 
to defer to the executive branch in that case, even though the statute at 
                                                                                                             
can be in the form of an amicus brief, a statement of interest, a letter, or a declaration. 
There is no public explanation for which format is used in particular cases. When the 
State Department writes a letter detailing its view of a case, it is often submitted to the 
court attached to a Statement of Interest filed by the Justice Department. 
 45. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (quoting Baker 
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)). 
 46. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 773 (1972) 
(Douglas, J., concurring). 
 47. See, e.g., Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943) (holding that if a 
suggestion of immunity is filed, it is the “court’s duty” to surrender jurisdiction); Wei Ye 
v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he immunity of foreign leaders 
remains the province of the Executive Branch.”). 
 48. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 43 (2d ed. 1996) (“It is no longer questioned that the President does not 
merely perform the ceremony of receiving foreign ambassadors but also determines whether 
the United States should recognize or refuse to recognize a foreign government . . . .”). 
 49. 541 U.S. 677, 701 (2004) (quoting I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 
(1987)). 
 50. Id. 
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issue, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, concerned foreign affairs 
and diplomatic relations.51 
The most difficult deference decisions arise in cases involving foreign 
policy concerns traditionally considered within the constitutional powers 
of the executive and legislative branches. 
Three ill-defined and contentious doctrines—the political question doc-
trine, the act of state doctrine, and comity—determine whether a case 
otherwise properly within a court’s jurisdiction should be dismissed be-
cause of the foreign affairs implications of the litigation. 
The political question doctrine directs the courts to decline to decide a 
case otherwise properly presented for resolution because the dispute pre-
sents issues constitutionally assigned to the political branches of the gov-
ernment.52 The Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr listed the six factors that 
may trigger the doctrine: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political ques-
tion is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the 
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibil-
ity of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly 
for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coor-
dinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various depart-
ments on one question.53 
The act of state doctrine instructs the courts to dismiss a case that in-
trudes on the legal authority of a foreign sovereign when the case requires 
the court to “declare invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign per-
                                                                                                             
 51. Id. at 700–02. As the Court emphasized in Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American 
Cetacean Society: 
We are cognizant of the interplay between these [statutes] and the 
conduct of this Nation’s foreign relations, and we recognize the pre-
mier role which both Congress and the Executive play in this field. 
But under the Constitution, one of the Judiciary’s characteristic roles 
is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely 
because our decision may have significant political overtones. 
478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986). 
 52. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 53. Id. 
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formed within its own territory” in “the absence of a treaty or other un-
ambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles.”54  
Comity refers to a discretionary decision to defer to the rules of the for-
eign country in a case posing a conflict between U.S. law and foreign 
law.55 
Recently, the Supreme Court muddied the analysis by referring, with-
out explanation, to “a policy of case-specific deference to the political 
branches.”56 The Court cited Republic of Austria v. Altmann, which 
stated that, in some circumstances, the State Department’s opinion on the 
implications of exercising jurisdiction over a particular case “might well 
be entitled to deference as the considered judgment of the Executive on a 
particular question of foreign policy.”57 Courts and commentators gener-
ally agree that “case-specific deference” must be an application of the 
political question, act of state, or comity doctrines, and not an offhanded 
creation of a new doctrine.58 
                                                                                                             
 54. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401, 428 (1964) (dismissing 
a dispute that turned on the validity of the Cuban government’s expropriation of private 
property). See also W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics, 493 U.S. 400 (1990) 
(rejecting a motion for dismissal of an action alleging that a company obtained contract 
from the Nigerian government through bribery of Nigerian officials, holding that the act 
of state doctrine does not require dismissal of claim that might “embarrass” foreign gov-
ernments).  
 55. Analysis of comity is confused by the fact that several doctrines are often lumped 
together under that label. See Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping “International Comity,” 83 
IOWA L. REV. 893, 897 (1998) (stating that “comity” is used to refer to at least four sepa-
rate doctrines: “(1) recognition of foreign judgments; (2) interpretation of foreign law; (3) 
limits on extraterritorial reach of U.S. law; and (4) enforcement of foreign law”). 
 56. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004). 
 57. 541 U.S. 677, 702 (2004). 
 58. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 262 n.10 (2d Cir. 
2007) (per curium), aff’d due to lack of a quorum sub nom., American Isuzu Motors, Inc. 
v. Ntsebeza, 2008 WL 117862, 76 U.S.L.W. 3405 (May 12, 2008) (No. 07-919) (noting 
that “[t]he parties agree that Sosa’s reference to ‘case-specific deference’ implicates ei-
ther the political question or international comity doctrine”); Whiteman v. Dorotheum 
GmbH & Co., 431 F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that case-specific deference “has 
long been established under the prudential justiciability doctrine known as the ‘political 
question doctrine’”); Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (interpreting “case-
specific deference” as a lens through which to apply the political question doctrine); Doe 
v. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1291 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s 
reference to case-specific deference and concluding that “The act of state doctrine em-
bodies these same concerns, and thus consideration may properly be given to it in the 
cases at bar”). See also Separation of Powers—Foreign Sovereign Immunity—Second 
Circuit Uses Political Question Doctrine to Hold Claims Against Austria Nonjusticiable 
Under Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act—Whiteman v. Dorotheum GMBH & Co., 431 
F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2006), 119 HARV. L. REV. 2292, 2297 (2006) (rejecting the concept of “a 
new doctrine of deference” and concluding that the Supreme Court’s comments “are 
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The Court has emphasized that these doctrines must be applied with 
care to avoid the unconstitutional rejection of cases that are properly 
within the powers of the judicial branch. The Court warned that: 
The doctrine of which we treat is one of “political questions,” not one 
of “political cases.” The courts cannot reject as “no law suit” a bona 
fide controversy as to whether some action denominated “political” ex-
ceeds constitutional authority. The cases we have reviewed show the 
necessity for discriminating inquiry into the precise facts and posture of 
the particular case, and the impossibility of resolution by any semantic 
cataloguing.59 
Where the administration argues that a particular case could interfere 
with executive branch foreign policies, the courts must assess the claims 
in light of the specific requirements of the relevant foreign affairs doc-
trines. 
In cases that potentially trigger one of these doctrines, the views of the 
executive branch receive respectful consideration but are not dispositive. 
In a case involving property expropriations in Cuba at the height of the 
Cold War, for example, the Supreme Court refused to follow the admini-
stration’s views as to the applicability of the act of state doctrine.60 Jus-
tice Powell noted that separation of powers concerns limit the deference 
that the judiciary can constitutionally grant to administration views: “I 
would be uncomfortable with a doctrine which would require the judici-
ary to receive the Executive’s permission before invoking its jurisdiction. 
Such a notion, in the name of the doctrine of separation of powers, seems 
to me to conflict with that very doctrine.”61 Justice Brennan also recog-
nized that the executive branch has limited authority over the interpreta-
tion of the constitutionally assigned judicial power, observing that “[t]he 
Executive Branch . . . cannot by simple stipulation change a political 
question into a cognizable claim.”62 Noting that six members of the 
Court shared his view on this point, Justice Brennan added, “the repre-
sentations of the Department of State are entitled to weight for the light 
                                                                                                             
better understood as confirming that existing discretionary doctrines should be applied 
vigilantly to protect the Executive’s constitutional foreign affairs prerogative”); The Su-
preme Court, 2003 Term—Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L. REV. 466, 475 (2004) (describ-
ing the suggestion of case-by-case deference as “wholly unnecessary” in light of the 
availability of the political question and act of state doctrines).  
 59. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).  
 60. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). 
 61. Id. at 773 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 62. Id. at 788–89 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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they shed on the permutation and combination of factors underlying the 
act of state doctrine. But they cannot be determinative.”63 
In another case involving Cuba, Regan v. Wald, the Court deferred to 
the views of the administration, but only after considering the logical 
coherence of those views and the supporting evidence.64 Regan chal-
lenged an executive order that prohibited U.S. citizens from spending 
money in Cuba; the executive branch maintained that rejecting the ban 
would undermine the U.S. foreign policy goal of denying Cuba access to 
foreign currency.65 The Court concluded that the prohibition was justi-
fied by “the evidence presented to both the District Court and the Court 
of Appeals.”66 Administration submissions may be entitled to less defer-
ence, however, if they are not consistent over time. In Regan, the Court 
noted that Presidents Kennedy, Carter, and Reagan had all agreed “that 
the continued exercise of [the currency restrictions] against Cuba is in 
the national interest.”67 In a more recent decision, American Insurance 
Ass’n v. Garamendi, the Court also considered the logic underlying the 
administration’s claim that a state law would interfere with a national 
approach to insurance claims arising out of the Holocaust, concluding 
that “[t]he approach taken [by the executive branch] serves to resolve . . . 
several competing matters of national concern” at issue in the dispute.68 
The lower courts have also rejected any implication that the courts are 
required to follow executive branch guidance in cases impacting foreign 
affairs. As the Second Circuit explained in Allied Bank International v. 
Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, the applicability of the act of state 
doctrine “may be guided but not controlled by the position, if any, articu-
lated by the executive as to the applicability vel non of the doctrine to a 
particular set of facts. Whether to invoke the act of state doctrine is ulti-
mately and always a judicial question.”69 The Third Circuit promulgated 
a similar standard in Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 
holding that the State Department’s legal conclusions regarding the act of 
state doctrine were “not controlling on the courts,” but that its “factual 
assessment of whether fulfillment of its responsibilities will be preju-
diced by the course of civil litigation is entitled to substantial respect.”70 
                                                                                                             
 63. Id. at 790 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 64. 468 U.S. 222, 238–39 (1984). 
 65. Id. at 243. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. 539 U.S. 396, 422 (2003). 
 69. 757 F.2d 516, 521 n.2 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 70. 847 F.2d 1052, 1062 (3d Cir. 1988), aff’d, 493 U.S. 400 (1990). 
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Similarly, an executive branch claim that a case presents a political 
question is not controlling. In Alperin v. Vatican Bank, for instance, the 
Ninth Circuit stated that if “the State Department express[es] a view [on 
whether a case presents a political question], that fact would certainly 
weigh” in the court’s determination.71 In Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner 
Bank AG, the Eleventh Circuit found an ATS suit justiciable over the 
objections of the executive branch, noting, “This statement of interest 
from the executive is entitled to deference . . . . A statement of national 
interest alone, however, does not take the present litigation outside of the 
competence of the judiciary.”72 The Second Circuit in Kadic v. Karadzic 
stated that “an assertion of the political question doctrine by the Execu-
tive Branch, entitled to respectful consideration, would not necessarily 
preclude adjudication.”73 
In City of N.Y. v. Permanent Mission of India to the U.N., the court re-
jected the executive branch’s views as too vague and speculative: “[W]e 
find none of the cited issues, presented in a largely vague and speculative 
manner, potentially severe enough or raised with the level of specificity 
required to justify presently a dismissal on foreign policy grounds.”74 
Other cases have indicated that the court would reject arbitrary or unsup-
ported executive branch views. In National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. 
M/T Stolt Sheaf, for instance, the court found there was “no indication 
that [the executive branch submission] is an arbitrary or ad hoc direc-
tive.”75 Similarly, the court in Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily recog-
nized that a “court might boggle at an ‘ad hoc, pro hac vice’ directive of 
the government.”76 
More recently, the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of 
considering executive branch views in the context of the particular facts 
and parties involved in a case. In a case involving foreign sovereign im-
munity, the Court stated that “should the State Department choose to ex-
press its opinion on the implications of exercising jurisdiction over par-
                                                                                                             
 71. Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 556, 562 (9th Cir. 2005) (dismissing, 
under the political question doctrine, claims regarding war crimes committed by an en-
emy of the United States during World War II). 
 72. 379 F.3d 1227, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004). The claims were ultimately dismissed on 
comity grounds. Id. at 1237–40. See also In Re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defen-
dants Litig., 129 F. Supp. 2d 370, 380 (D.N.J. 2001) (noting that a “Statement of Interest 
is non-binding on the Court”). 
 73. 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 74. 446 F.3d 365, 377 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006), aff’d, Permanent Mission of India to the 
United Nations v. City of New York, 127 S. Ct. 2352 (2007). 
 75. 860 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 76. 118 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir.1997), abrogated on other grounds, JPMorgan Chase 
Bank v. Traffic Stream, 536 U.S. 88 (2002). 
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ticular petitioners in connection with their alleged conduct, that opinion 
might well be entitled to deference as the considered judgment of the 
Executive on a particular question of foreign policy.”77 Referring to the 
possibility of affording “case-specific deference to the political 
branches,” the Court in Sosa noted that in some cases “there is a strong 
argument that federal courts should give serious weight to the Executive 
Branch’s view of the case’s impact on foreign policy.”78 
B. The Standard for Deference 
It is difficult to glean from these cases a standard that articulates the 
deference due to an executive branch statement that a case will have a 
negative impact on U.S. foreign policy. At minimum, such statements are 
not definitive; the decisions state that much repeatedly. The cases dis-
cussed in the prior section state that the courts will be “guided but not 
controlled” by executive branch views79 and reserve the right to reject 
views that are “vague” or “speculative.”80 However, in appropriate cases, 
the courts give “serious weight,”81 “substantial respect,”82 and “respectful 
consideration”83 to executive branch views. Capturing the inadequacy of 
these formulations, Justice Brennan stated that executive branch views 
are entitled to “weight for the light they shed”84 — a circular statement 
indicating nothing about how a court will determine whether those views 
shed any light at all on the issues facing the court. 
As these cases show, even when following the recommendations of the 
executive branch, the Supreme Court has reviewed the logic of those 
views and the supporting evidence, and has noted the importance of indi-
cations that the views are well-founded.85 We can draw further guidance 
by focusing on courts’ analyses of two facets of administration submis-
sions. First, the executive branch generally informs the court of the sub-
                                                                                                             
 77. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 702 (2004) (citation omitted). 
 78. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004). 
 79. Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521 n.2 
(2d Cir. 1985). 
 80. City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 446 F.3d 
365, 377 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006), aff’d, Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. 
City of New York, 127 S. Ct. 2352 (2007). 
 81. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21. 
 82. Envtl. Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1062 (3d Cir. 1988), 
aff’d, 493 U.S. 400 (1990). 
 83. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 84. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 790 (1972) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 85. See discussion of Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984), and American Insurance 
Association v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003), supra text accompanying notes 64–68. 
788 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:3 
stance of the relevant foreign policy interests. On this, the courts are 
unlikely to raise any challenges; setting U.S. government foreign policy 
is clearly within the constitutional powers of the political branches. Sec-
ond, the submission must explain how the litigation would harm those 
policy interests. Here, the courts are more likely to question administra-
tion assertions and to reject them if they do not appear logical or well-
reasoned. 86 Executive branch views merit deference when they are logi-
cal and reasonable, that is, when their conclusions are well-founded and 
supported by the evidence provided.87 
The requirement that views must be reasonable in order to merit defer-
ence seems relatively uncontroversial, even to those who favor height-
ened judicial deference. For example, in a recent article about deference 
and foreign relations law, Professors Posner and Sunstein argued that the 
courts should afford heightened deference to the executive branch when 
interpreting legislation that touches upon foreign affairs; they noted re-
peatedly that their approach would—“of course”—only apply to reason-
able executive branch views.88 Similarly, in a dissenting opinion that was 
sharply critical of a district court’s failure to defer to administration 
views, Judge Kavanaugh also recognized this requirement: “It is not 
enough . . . for the Executive Branch merely to assert harm; rather, the 
harm must be explained—and explained reasonably.”89 Of course, as in 
any evaluation of reasonableness, there will inevitably be differences of 
opinion. As a case in point, Judge Kavanaugh finds reasonable an execu-
tive submission I find to be patently unreasonable,90 as discussed in Part 
IV. 
                                                                                                             
 86. For a similar effort to develop a standard to guide deference see Margarita S. 
Clarens, Deference, Human Rights and the Federal Courts: The Role of the Executive in 
Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 415, 431 (2007) (stating that a 
reasonable explanation should include “the specific and foreseeable” harms that the liti-
gation will inflict). 
 87. The two halves of this approach could collapse into one: one definition of “rea-
sonable” is “supported or justified by fact or circumstance.” Merriam-Webster’s Diction-
ary of Law, Reasonable, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/reasonable.  
 88. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 
YALE L.J. 1170, 1198 (2007) (“If the executive’s interpretation is unreasonable, of 
course, it will be invalid . . . .”). Further refining the rule, Professors Jinks and Katyal 
attempt to add some traction to the standard, focusing on whether the executive branch 
has engaged in a “deliberative process” producing “reasoned analysis.” Derek Jinks & 
Neal Kuma Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1247–48 
(2007). 
 89. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345, 362 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting). 
 90. Id. 
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These different factors combine to contribute to a proposed standard by 
which to evaluate administration views. In order to merit deference, an 
administration submission must (1) articulate the relevant policy inter-
ests; (2) explain how the litigation could harm those interests; (3) tie the 
anticipated harm to one of the recognized foreign policy justiciability 
doctrines; and finally, (4) the explanations offered must be reasonable, 
drawing conclusions that are well-founded and supported by the facts. 
The reported cases indicate that, as of 2002, courts generally did defer 
to the executive branch’s views that a case would have an impact on for-
eign policy. In 2002, a district court judge wrote: “[P]laintiffs have not 
cited, and the court has not found, a single case in which a court permit-
ted a lawsuit to proceed in the face of an expression of concern such as 
that communicated by the State Department here.”91 There may be un-
published cases prior to that date in which the court disregarded the 
views of the State Department, or published cases in which the court 
reached its decision without mentioning that the State Department had 
filed an objection. Nevertheless, it seems safe to conclude that, prior to 
the administration of George W. Bush, the courts rarely rejected an ex-
ecutive branch recommendation that a case should be dismissed under 
one of the justiciability doctrines because of its foreign policy implica-
tions. 
In contrast, as developed below, the Bush administration’s submissions 
in corporate-defendant ATS cases were rejected by the courts more often 
than they were followed. Those submissions combined many of the ad-
ministration’s more extreme views of the role of the executive branch in 
litigation touching on foreign affairs. The submissions also included ex-
aggerated claims that human rights litigation would have catastrophic 
results. The courts have been remarkably consistent in rebutting these 
concerns. After a review of prior executive branch submissions in ATS 
litigation in Part III, Part IV analyzes the courts’ remarkably skeptical 
reception of Bush administration submissions stating that corporate-
defendant litigation would harm U.S. foreign policy interests. 
III. EXECUTIVE SUBMISSIONS IN ATS CASES: THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS 
Executive branch responses to litigation under the ATS from 1980 
through 2000 varied from the strong support of the administrations of 
Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton to the mixed views of the ad-
ministrations of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. 
                                                                                                             
 91. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1192 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
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Before ruling on the Filártiga appeal, the Second Circuit asked the 
State Department for its views on the case.92 In a joint submission on 
behalf of the Justice and State Departments, the Carter administration 
endorsed the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the ATS, agreeing that the stat-
ute authorized the federal courts to assert jurisdiction over claims for vio-
lations of modern-day, evolving international law norms.93 Far from rais-
ing concerns about potential interference with the executive branch’s 
foreign affairs powers, the Carter administration concluded that ATS 
cases would strengthen U.S. foreign policy goals, even though “such 
suits unquestionably implicate foreign policy considerations.”94 The brief 
recognized that the judiciary plays an important role in many issues that 
affect foreign affairs: “[N]ot every case or controversy which touches 
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. Like many other areas 
affecting international relations, the protection of fundamental human 
rights is not committed exclusively to the political branches of govern-
ment.”95 The administration concluded that if human rights litigation in 
U.S. courts were limited to cases in which “an individual has suffered a 
denial of rights guaranteed to him as an individual by customary interna-
tional law,” there would be “little danger that judicial enforcement will 
impair our foreign policy efforts.”96 
The next three administrations changed course several times. In Tra-
jano v. Marcos, the Reagan administration filed a brief in support of the 
estate of Ferdinand Marcos, the former dictator of the Philippines, which 
argued that ATS jurisdiction included only those cases in which the U.S. 
government might in some way be held responsible for a violation of 
international law.97 However, in a submission to the Supreme Court in 
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,98 the Reagan administration ex-
pressed little concern about the Filártiga precedent and opposed Su-
                                                                                                             
 92. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090), 1980 WL 340146. 
 93. Id. at 4. 
 94. Id. at 22–23. 
 95. Id. at 22 (citations omitted). 
 96. Id. 
 97. The administration defined those as cases in which (1) the tortfeasor was subject 
to U.S. jurisdiction at the time the tort was committed; (2) the United States could be 
accountable for the action; (3) Congress had passed a criminal statute defining the con-
duct as an offense against the law of nations; and (4) the federal statute provided a private 
right of action. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Trajano v. Marcos at 9–10, 
26–27, 878 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1989) (table disposition) (Nos. 86-2448, 86-15039). 
 98. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). 
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preme Court review.99 The administration argued that a grant of certiorari 
would be premature because of the divided opinions of the D.C. Circuit 
in that case and the possibility that the lower courts might clarify the 
“complex issues of federal jurisdiction, international law and statutory 
construction . . . without such review.”100 
The administration of President George H.W. Bush expressed opposi-
tion to the Filártiga doctrine in testimony before Congress,101 but did not 
file any submissions in ATS cases during its four years in office. The 
Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”) was enacted during that ad-
ministration.102 The statute creates an explicit cause of action for torture 
and extrajudicial executions. Despite misgivings about the impact of hu-
man rights litigation, President George H.W. Bush signed the TVPA and 
offered strong support for the goals of the statute: 
These potential dangers, however, do not concern the fundamental 
goals that this legislation seeks to advance. In this new era, in which 
countries throughout the world are turning to democratic institutions 
and the rule of law, we must maintain and strengthen our commitment 
to ensuring that human rights are respected everywhere.103 
Under President Bill Clinton, the executive branch once again sup-
ported human rights litigation and the Filártiga interpretation of the 
ATS. In Kadic v. Karadzic, the Departments of State and Justice filed a 
joint Statement of Interest supporting federal jurisdiction over human 
rights claims and thereby rejecting the limitations proposed by the 
Reagan administration in Marcos.104 In Doe v. Unocal, in response to a 
                                                                                                             
 99. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Re-
public, 726 F.2d 774 (D.D.C. 1984) (No. 83-2052). 
 100. Id. at 9. 
 101. During hearings on the Torture Victim Protection Act, administration representa-
tives argued that the statute would improperly assert jurisdiction over actions which have 
no connection to the United States, risk provoking retaliatory lawsuits against U.S. offi-
cials, and involve individual litigants in foreign policy decisions. See Torture Victim Pro-
tection Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 1629 and H.R. 1662 Before the Subcomm. on Immi-
gration and Refugee Affairs of the S. Judiciary Comm., 101st Cong. 11–16 (1990) (state-
ment of John O. McGinnis, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice) & 22–
29 (1990) (statement of David P. Stewart, Assistant Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State). 
 102. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified as 
a note to the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350). 
 103. Statement on Signing the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 465, 466 (Mar. 12, 1992). 
 104. Statement of Interest of the United States at 1–2, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 
(2d Cir. 1995) (Nos. 94-9035, 94-9069). 
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request from the district court, the Clinton administration stated that the 
litigation would not interfere with foreign affairs.105 
IV. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S EXECUTIVE SUBMISSIONS AND THE 
JUDICIAL RESPONSE 
The administration of President George W. Bush has adamantly op-
posed ATS litigation and the Filártiga doctrine. In an amicus brief filed 
in the appeal of Doe v. Unocal, the Department of Justice urged the 
Ninth Circuit to overrule several prior decisions adopting the Filártiga 
doctrine and argued that ATS claims interfered with “important foreign 
policy interests.”106 The administration submitted similar arguments in 
support of the petitioner in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, asserting that judi-
cial consideration of any ATS human rights claim would be “incompati-
ble” with the political branches’ constitutional foreign affairs powers and 
thus would violate the constitutional separation of powers.107 In rejecting 
this argument, the Sosa Court declined to adopt the executive branch’s 
interpretation of the ATS without even referring to the sweeping consti-
tutional claims in the administration’s brief. 
After these unsuccessful efforts to convince the courts to reject ATS 
litigation in toto, the administration sought to significantly restrict its 
reach, particularly as applied to corporate defendants. 
A. The Bush Administration’s Opposition to Corporate Cases 
After the Supreme Court decision in Sosa, the Bush administration re-
lied on several specific arguments aimed at blocking corporate-defendant 
cases. The administration argued that the courts should not permit claims 
by aliens for events that occur outside of the United States and should 
not recognize aiding and abetting liability under the ATS.108 In addition, 
                                                                                                             
 105. Statement of Interest of the United States, Nat’l Coal. Gov’t of the Union of 
Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (No. 96-6112), reprinted as 
Exhibit A, Nat’l Coal. Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 361–62. 
 106. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 
708 (9th Cir. 2005) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628). See also Supplemental Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628). Submitted after the Supreme Court decision in Sosa v. Alva-
rez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), the brief argued that imposing aiding and abetting 
liability “could interfere with the ability of the U.S. government to employ the full range 
of foreign policy options when interacting with regimes with oppressive human rights 
practices.” 
 107. Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 31–40, Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339). 
 108. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2–3, Khulumani v. Bar-
clay National Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (Nos. 05-2141, 05-2326). 
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the submissions asserted broadly that claims against corporations would 
deter investment and trade, triggering economic downturns that could 
have devastating consequences for the United States and its allies.109 
In Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., for example, plaintiffs alleged that 
Exxon paid and directed members of the Indonesian military to commit 
acts of torture and murder in the course of protecting natural gas facilities 
in Aceh, Indonesia.110 The Department of State filed a letter stating that 
the lawsuit could endanger key U.S. interests, asserting that because In-
donesia would perceive the lawsuit as “interference in its internal af-
fairs,” it might decrease cooperation with the United States on a range of 
issues, including terrorism.111 The letter claimed that the case would lead 
to decreased foreign investment in Indonesia and curtail investment op-
portunities for U.S. businesses.112 The result would be to undermine In-
donesia’s economic and political stability and the security of the entire 
region, thereby “risk[ing] a potentially serious adverse impact on signifi-
cant interests of the United States, including interests related directly to 
the on-going struggle against international terrorism.”113 
In a similar tone, the administration objected to Mujica v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., a lawsuit seeking to hold the defendant liable for the 
bombing of a village by the Colombian military.114 The administration 
expressed concern that such lawsuits could deter U.S. investment in Co-
lombia, causing a downturn in Colombia’s economy and harming U.S. 
interests in Colombia and the region: 
[S]uch downturns could damage the stability of Colombia, the Colom-
bian government’s U.S.-supported campaigns against terrorists and 
narcotics traffickers, regional security, our efforts to reduce the amount 
of drugs that reach the streets of the United States, promotion of the 
rule of law and human rights in Colombia, and protection of U.S. per-
sons, government facilities, and investments. Finally, reduced U.S. in-
vestment in Colombia’s oil industry may detract from the vital U.S. 
                                                                                                             
 109. See, e.g., Letter from William H. Taft, Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State at 2, Mujica 
v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (No. 03-2860). 
 110. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2005), petition for 
cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3050 (July 20, 2007) (No. 07-81). 
 111. Letter from William H. Taft, Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State at 3, Doe v. Exxon 
Mobil, 393 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005) (No. 01-1357). 
 112. Id. at 3–4. 
 113. Id. at 1. 
 114. Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168–69 (C.D. Cal. 
2005) (appeal pending). 
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policy goal of expanding and diversifying our sources of imported 
oil.115 
Administration views are discussed in more detail in the following sec-
tion, along with the judicial responses. 
B. Judicial Rejection of the Bush Administration Views 
The judiciary has been remarkably skeptical of the administration’s 
views in corporate-defendant cases. Leaving aside cases arising out of 
World War II, the executive branch has submitted views in ten ATS cor-
porate-defendant cases.116 Although each of the cases involves distin-
guishable facts and slightly different U.S. government approaches, the 
scorecard is nevertheless striking: only two claims have been dismissed 
in response to the administration’s foreign policy concerns, while one 
has been dismissed on other grounds, five have been permitted to pro-
ceed,117 one is still pending,118 and one settled before the court consid-
ered the administration’s views.119 Moreover, one of the two cases in 
which the claims were dismissed on foreign policy grounds involved a 
U.S. government contractor.120 Cases involving the U.S. government are 
the most likely to trigger concerns about judicial interference with the 
                                                                                                             
 115. Letter from William H. Taft, Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State at 2, Mujica v. Occi-
dental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (No. 03-2860). 
 116. For a detailed description of the ten submissions, see Appendix C. 
 117. The administration fared slightly better in the district courts than in the circuit 
courts: In two cases, the district courts granted motions to dismiss, which were then over-
turned on appeal. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002), 
rev’d by 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), reh’g granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007); In 
re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev’d, Khulumani v. 
Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), aff'd due to lack of a quorum sub 
nom., American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 2008 WL 117862, 76 U.S.L.W. 3405 
(May 12, 2008) (No. 07-919). 
 118. In the pending action, a state court case, Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., the judge 
asked the State Department’s views as to the impact of the case on U.S. foreign policy. 
Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, Bowoto v. Chevron, Corp., No. 03-417580 
(Super. Ct. Cal. May 29, 2007). The State Department submission addresses only a nar-
row issue, asking that the court refrain from granting injunctive relief that would require 
that the defendant comply with the voluntary corporate code of conduct developed by the 
executive branch. Id. at 2, 5–7. The court has not ruled on that issue. In a parallel federal 
court action, the judge declined defendant’s request that the court seek the executive 
branch’s views on the litigation. Bowoto v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 99 Civ. 2506, at 
3–5 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2004) (Order Denying Motion for Court to Request Views). 
 119. For citations to the various decisions in Doe v. Unocal and the procedural history 
of the case, see supra note 32. 
 120. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (involving a U.S.-
government-approved contract to sell bulldozers to Israel). 
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powers of the executive branch. In another government contractor case, 
In re Agent Orange, the district court rejected most of the administra-
tion’s arguments and held that the claims were justiciable, but found that 
the acts alleged did not constitute a war crime at the time they oc-
curred.121 Thus, the courts have accepted the executive branch’s views in 
only one of the corporate-defendant cases that did not involve a U.S. 
government contractor. That case, Mujica v. Occidental, is still pending 
on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.122 This record is all the more remarkable 
considering that a district court judge in 2002 stated that she was unable 
to find a single case in which the courts had allowed a case to proceed in 
the face of a formal statement of concern from the State Department.123 
The five cases in which the courts have permitted at least some claims 
to proceed over the objections of the administration are worth exploring 
in more detail. 
1. Arias v. Dyncorp  
In Arias v. Dyncorp,124 in which a claim was brought for injuries 
caused when pesticides sprayed in Colombia drifted across the border 
into Ecuador, the executive branch submitted a detailed, eleven-page 
declaration stating in strong terms that the litigation “pose[d] grave risks 
to U.S. national security interests, foreign policy objectives and diplo-
matic relations in the Andean Region.”125 The submission offers a stark 
warning about the dangers of the litigation: 
The Arias plaintiffs challenge an aerial drug eradication program that 
has been repeatedly authorized by the executive and legislative 
branches after extensive deliberation as a key element in U.S. counter-
narcotics strategy. Any disruption of this program would cripple United 
States efforts to stem the flow of narcotics into this country, provide a 
financial boon to international terrorist organizations that have targeted 
U.S. interests, and significantly undermine the prospects of strong and 
                                                                                                             
 121. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 
517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008) (dismissing a suit by Vietnamese victims of herbicides used 
by the U.S. government during the Vietnam War after finding that the alleged actions did 
not violate international law norms recognized at that time). 
 122. Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1194–95 (C.D. Cal. 
2005). 
 123. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1192 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 124. 517 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 125. Declaration of Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Interna-
tional Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Regarding Potential Impact of Arias Liti-
gation on the United States National Security and Foreign Policy Interests at 10, Arias v. 
DynCorp, 517 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 01-1980). 
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stable relations between the United States and Colombia and other An-
dean nations. The stakes are high.126 
Nevertheless, the court refused to dismiss the case, holding that the 
claim did not challenge executive branch foreign policies or the imple-
mentation of those policies, because “the intended means of executing 
the policy in this case did not include the acts challenged here, which 
plaintiffs allege were specifically prohibited by the plan.”127 
2. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. 
In Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., Indonesian villagers sued for injuries in-
flicted by a company security force comprised of members of the Indo-
nesian military.128 The State Department stated that the lawsuit would 
lead Indonesia to decrease cooperation on counter-terrorism initiatives129 
and could undermine the country’s economic and political stability, af-
fecting the security of the entire region and thereby “risk[ing] a poten-
tially serious adverse impact on significant interests of the United States, 
including interests related directly to the on-going struggle against inter-
national terrorism.”130 Although the district court dismissed the federal 
law claims, it refused to dismiss the state common law tort claims, hold-
ing that carefully controlled litigation and discovery would avoid inter-
ference with Indonesia’s sovereign interests.131 Defendants sought a writ 
of mandamus from the D.C. Circuit, which the Circuit denied.132 
                                                                                                             
 126. Id. at 10–11. 
 127. 517 F. Supp. 2d at 225. The court permitted the plaintiffs to depose the admini-
stration official who submitted the declaration. Deposition of Rand Beers, Arias v. Dyn-
corp, 517 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 01-1980). 
 128. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp, 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 129. Letter from William H. Taft, Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State at 3, Doe v. Exxon 
Mobil, 393 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005) (No. 01-1357). 
 130. Id. at 1. The letter observed, however, that “[its] assessment [was] ‘necessarily 
predictive and contingent on how the case’” proceeded, including the “intrusiveness of 
discovery” and the extent to which the case required “judicial pronouncements on the 
official actions of the [Government of Indonesia] with respect to the conduct of its mili-
tary activities in Aceh.” Id. at 2 n.1. 
 131. 393 F. Supp. 2d at 28–29. The court accepted that adjudication of the international 
law claims of genocide and crimes against humanity would require an assessment of 
“whether the Indonesian military was engaged in a plan allegedly to eliminate segments 
of the population,” which “would be an impermissible intrusion in Indonesia’s internal 
affairs” and would “require[] the court to evaluate the policy or practice of the foreign 
state,” and dismissed those claims, while permitting the state law claims to proceed. Id at 
25, 28–29. 
 132. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345, 354 (D.C. Cir. 2007), petition for cert. 
filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3050 (July 20, 2007) (No. 07-81). Judge Kavanaugh, who served as a 
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3. Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank, Ltd. 
In Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank, Ltd., South Africans filed 
three lawsuits against dozens of corporations for damages stemming 
from the defendants’ operations in South Africa during the Apartheid 
regime.133 The executive branch filed a Statement of Interest in the dis-
trict court, accompanied by a letter from the South African government 
asserting that adjudication of these cases would interfere with South Af-
rica’s reconciliation process.134 The case was mentioned repeatedly in the 
Supreme Court briefing in the Sosa case, with the U.S. government, Sosa 
himself, and the amici writing in his support all portraying the case as an 
example of the foreign policy problems triggered by human rights litiga-
tion.135 The Sosa decision included a footnote mentioning the possibility 
of applying “a policy of case-specific deference to the political branches” 
to the Apartheid cases: 
The Government of South Africa has said that these cases interfere with 
the policy embodied by its Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
which “deliberately avoided a ‘victors’ justice’ approach to the crimes 
of apartheid and chose instead one based on confession and absolution, 
informed by the principles of reconciliation, reconstruction, reparation 
and goodwill.” . . . The United States has agreed. . . . In such cases, 
there is a strong argument that federal courts should give serious weight 
to the Executive Branch’s view of the case’s impact on foreign pol-
icy.136 
The district court dismissed because it found that aiding and abetting 
liability was not actionable under the ATS.137 On appeal, the administra-
tion submitted a brief urging that the Second Circuit affirm the lower 
court’s rejection of aiding and abetting liability and arguing against rec-
ognition of extraterritorial claims under the ATS.138 The Second Circuit 
reversed the dismissal, holding that aiding and abetting liability does 
trigger ATS jurisdiction, and remanded to the district court with instruc-
                                                                                                             
legal advisor to President Bush before his appointment to the D.C. Circuit, filed a 
strongly worded dissent. Id. at 357 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 133. 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), aff’d due to lack of a quorum sub nom., American 
Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 2008 WL 117862, 76 U.S.L.W. 3405 (May 12, 2008) 
(No. 07-919). 
 134. Id. at 298 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 135. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260. 
 138. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3–4, Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l 
Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (Nos. 05-2141, 05-2326). 
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tions to permit plaintiffs to file an amended complaint.139 Given the like-
lihood of an amended complaint, the court refused to reach the political 
question issues, rejecting the argument that the Supreme Court’s Sosa 
footnote required dismissal of the suit.140 In their separate concurring 
opinions, neither of the two judges in the majority even discussed the 
executive branch’s argument that recognition of aiding and abetting li-
ability would constitute an unconstitutional interference with the foreign 
policy powers of the executive branch. The dissent argued that the panel 
should have dismissed the claim as a political question, based on the ob-
jections of the U.S. and South African governments and the concerns 
expressed by the Supreme Court.141 
4. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. 
In Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., residents of 
southern Sudan sued a Canadian corporation, seeking compensation for 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and other violations of international 
law.142 The State Department submitted a letter to the court that attached 
a diplomatic note from the Canadian government stating that the litiga-
tion infringed on the foreign relations of Canada.143 The U.S. letter stated 
that the State Department shared the Canadian government’s concerns 
and urged the court to take a narrow view of the ATS in order to avoid 
such conflicts.144 The letter also stated the department’s concerns about 
the dangers of taking an expansive interpretation of ATS jurisdiction.145 
The district court rejected the views of both the U.S. and Canadian gov-
ernments, finding the Canadian government’s expressed concerns unper-
suasive because there was no showing that the pending litigation would 
interfere with Canada’s foreign policy: 
While this Court may not question either the accuracy of the de-
scription of Canada’s foreign policy in its Letter, or the wisdom and ef-
fectiveness of that foreign policy, it remains appropriate to consider the 
degree to which that articulated foreign policy applies to this litigation. 
                                                                                                             
 139. 504 F.3d at 261. 
 140. Id. at 262–63, 263 n.14. 
 141. 504 F.3d at 295–98 (Korman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (discussing 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004)). 
 142. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (granting motion for summary judgment) (appeal pending). 
 143. Statement of Interest of the United States at 2, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. 
Talisman Energy Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 01-9882). 
 144. Letter from William H. Taft, Legal Advisor at 2–3, Presbyterian Church of Sudan 
v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 01-9882). 
 145. Id. at 3. 
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. . . While there is no requirement that a government’s letter must sup-
port its position with detailed argument . . . dismissal is only warranted 
as a matter of international comity where the nexus between the lawsuit 
and that foreign policy is sufficiently apparent and the importance of 
the relevant foreign policy outweighs the public’s interest in vindicat-
ing the values advanced by the lawsuit. Even giving substantial defer-
ence to the Canada Letter, Talisman has not shown that dismissal of 
this action is appropriate.146 
The case was later dismissed on a motion for summary judgment; an 
appeal of that dismissal is currently pending. 
5. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC  
In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, residents of Papua New Guinea brought an 
ATS action against an international mining company alleging interna-
tional law violations in connection with the operation of a copper 
mine.147 The State Department filed a Statement of Interest (“SOI”) stat-
ing that the litigation “would risk a potentially serious adverse impact on 
the peace process [in Papua New Guinea], and hence on the conduct of 
our foreign relations.”148 The submission attached a letter from the gov-
ernment of Papua New Guinea stating its objections to the litigation.149 
The district court dismissed the claim in deference to the views of the 
executive branch.150 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed.151 The court 
noted that, although it would give the government’s views “serious 
weight,” those views would not be controlling: “Ultimately, it is our re-
sponsibility to determine whether a political question is present, rather 
than to dismiss on that ground simply because the Executive Branch ex-
presses some hesitancy about a case proceeding.”152 The court concluded 
that the case did not trigger any of the factors requiring dismissal under 
the political question doctrine: 
The State Department explicitly did not request that we dismiss this 
suit on political question grounds, and we are confident that proceeding 
does not express any disrespect for the executive, even if it would pre-
                                                                                                             
 146. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 2005 WL 2082846, at 
*6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005). 
 147. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 2007), reh’g granted, 499 
F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 148. Letter from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State at 2, Sarei v. Rio 
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fer that the suit disappear. Nor do we see any “unusual need for un-
questioning adherence” to the SOI’s nonspecific invocations of risks to 
the peace process. And finally, given the guarded nature of the SOI, we 
see no “embarrassment” that would follow from fulfilling our inde-
pendent duty to determine whether the case should proceed. We are 
mindful of Sosa’s instruction to give “serious weight” to the views of 
the executive, but we cannot uphold the dismissal of this lawsuit solely 
on the basis of the SOI.153 
C. Judicial Scrutiny of Administration Claims in ATS Cases 
Although each of these lawsuits raises distinct issues, it is striking that 
the court in each case ignored or rejected the argument that the very exis-
tence of the lawsuit interfered with foreign policy interests. The courts 
analyzed the administration’s submissions through the lens of one or 
more of the three doctrines governing decisions to dismiss based on for-
eign affairs concerns and applied the requirements of those doctrines 
with great care. The decisions confirm that administration concerns about 
the foreign policy implications of a lawsuit do not necessarily require 
dismissal. Moreover, in these cases, the courts chose to parse the logic of 
the administration’s claims, often concluding that the concerns that the 
executive branch expressed did not support the conclusion that the litiga-
tion would interfere with executive branch foreign affairs powers. Do 
these holdings comply with the Supreme Court’s guidance? Yes, in that 
the Court, in the cases discussed above, has stated that the courts must 
review the factual and logical underpinnings of the executive branch’s 
views. If not, the independence of the judicial branch would be under-
mined, with the courts relegated to the unconstitutional role of merely 
following the executive branch’s instructions in any case touching upon 
foreign affairs. 
Are these holdings consistent with the standard I developed from past 
cases? Yes, in that the executive branch submissions fail the test on mul-
tiple grounds. The first prong of the test requires that the administration 
articulate the relevant policy interest. This prong is the least problematic: 
the courts have accepted the executive branch’s stated interest in fighting 
                                                                                                             
 153. Id. at 1206–07. The Ninth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc, id. at 1196–97, but 
did not consider the issues raised in the State Department letter because the government 
of Papua New Guinea had reversed its position on the litigation and the executive branch 
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En Banc at 14 n.3, cited in Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1206 n.14 (“[A]fter noting that the SOI was 
based on concerns in 2001 ‘which are different from the interests and circumstances that 
exist today’ the government expressly declines to endorse a dismissal of this case based 
on the SOI.”). 
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terrorism and drug trafficking and promoting the stability of allied gov-
ernments. The second prong, however, requires that the administration 
explain how the litigation could harm those interests, and the courts have 
repeatedly found that the corporate-defendant submissions fail this step. 
In Arias v. Dyncorp, for example, the court concluded that that acts chal-
lenged in the lawsuit—spraying pesticides in the wrong country—would 
not contribute to the executive branch’s stated foreign policy goals.154 
Similarly, the Exxon Mobil court found that the state claims could con-
tinue without threatening the policy interests asserted by the administra-
tion.155 And in Talisman, the court stated explicitly that the Canadian 
government had not demonstrated a nexus between the lawsuit and that 
nation’s foreign policy.156 
The executive branch submissions analyzed here also fail the third 
prong in that they do not link the harms they discuss to the recognized 
justiciability doctrines. They repeatedly overstate those doctrines, claim-
ing that lawsuits should be dismissed because of any foreign policy im-
plications, rather than applying the strict standards set forth by the Su-
preme Court precedents. 
Finally, the submissions fail the last prong, the requirement that the ar-
guments must be reasonable and draw conclusions that are well-founded 
and supported by the facts. Although the courts do not explicitly label the 
executive branch submissions as unreasonable or not well-founded, they 
repeatedly criticize the failure to connect the reality of the litigation at 
issue with the dangers predicted by the administration. They find that the 
alleged consequences lack supporting evidence. Indeed, the conclusion 
seems inevitable: the courts do not defer to these administration views 
because they are only obligated to defer to the “reasonable” views of the 
executive branch—and the courts find the views of the Bush administra-
tion to be unreasonable. 
V. THE LIMITS OF DEFERENCE: JUDICIAL REJECTION OF UNREASONABLE 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH VIEWS 
This review of judicial responses to Bush administration views reveals 
that, in a remarkable reversal of past practice, the federal courts have 
permitted a string of lawsuits to proceed despite the Bush administra-
tion’s assertions that the cases would interfere with U.S. foreign policy 
interests. The startling shift in the courts’ responses to executive submis-
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sions indicates that the courts do not find the submissions convincing: 
the Bush administration has failed the reasonableness test. Several short-
comings in the Bush administration approach led the judiciary to refuse 
to defer to administration views: excessive claims for deference, exag-
gerated predictions of harm, ill-supported economic claims, and a per-
ceived bias towards corporate interests. 
A. Excessive Claims for Deference 
The Bush administration overstated its powers, pushing for deference 
in areas traditionally viewed by the courts as within their purview. The 
Justice Department entered the ATS debate with a brief arguing that ATS 
litigation as a whole interfered with executive branch foreign affairs 
powers—and claiming that the courts should defer to this interpretation 
of the statute.157 The administration also claimed the right to dictate to 
the courts the proper interpretation of the treaties and customary interna-
tional law norms at issue in ATS cases.158 In Sosa, the Supreme Court 
rejected the administration’s views about the proper interpretation of the 
ATS and declined to defer to its views of the treaties and customary in-
ternational law at issue, thus rejecting both the substance of the admini-
stration’s arguments and its claim to deference on these issues.159 The 
Supreme Court and the lower courts rejected similar deference claims in 
other high profile cases.160 These excessive claims to deference have un-
dermined the administration’s credibility. 
B. Exaggerated Predictions of Harm 
The administration relied on arguments that were of questionable va-
lidity—or even patently absurd. In a globalized world in which litigants 
and courts have independent access to information about foreign gov-
ernments and the role of the United States, the courts can more easily 
dismiss such arguments. 
In corporate-defendant ATS cases, the administration claimed that the 
litigation could trigger instability that might impact a wide range of vital 
U.S. interests, including efforts to combat terrorism and the drug trade 
                                                                                                             
 157. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19–20, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 
403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628). 
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and to promote regional security around the world.161 At a time when 
lawsuits are routinely filed against multinational corporations for many 
different claims, it seems preposterous to assert that a single lawsuit 
could trigger such exaggerated harms. 
In Doe v. Exxon Mobil, for example, plaintiffs sought compensation for 
murder, torture, sexual assault, battery, false imprisonment, and other 
torts committed by the defendant’s security forces.162 The State Depart-
ment submission starts with the reasonable assertion that Indonesia might 
view the lawsuit as an “‘interference’ in its internal affairs.”163 It then 
suggests that Indonesia might respond by curtailing cooperation with the 
United States, thereby undermining U.S. counter-terrorism initiatives.164 
The letter also suggests that the litigation might worsen economic condi-
tions in Indonesia, “breed[ing] instability” that could “create problems 
ranging from interruption in vital shipping lanes, to refugee outflows, to 
a new home for terrorists”165 and could also “impact on the security” of 
Australia, Thailand, and other countries in the region.166 An economic 
downturn in Indonesia might also make it difficult for the government to 
hire the professional personnel it needs to make progress in “promoting 
regional stability, countering ethnic and sectarian violence, [and] com-
bating piracy, trafficking of persons, smuggling, narcotics trafficking, 
and environmentally unsustainable levels of fishing and logging.”167 
Plaintiffs responded to this letter with an expert affidavit debunking the 
administration’s parade of horrors.168 The affidavit noted that since Indo-
nesia cooperates with the United States in fighting terrorism “because it 
is in its own national interest to do so,” it has continued to do so despite 
repeated U.S. criticism of its human rights record.169 
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Similarly, Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. involved a raid on a 
village, during which cluster bombs were dropped on villagers resulting 
in the deaths of seventeen civilians, including children.170 The Colom-
bian government acknowledged that the bombing was unlawful and be-
gan a criminal investigation of those involved, and the U.S. government 
suspended economic assistance to the unit responsible for the bomb-
ing.171 Plaintiffs alleged that the raid was carried out by both military and 
civilian security agents acting on behalf of the defendants.172 The State 
Department letter in the case began with the reasonable suggestion that 
the courts of Colombia, if they could handle the case fairly, would be a 
preferable forum for a dispute about an atrocity that occurred in Colom-
bia.173 It also made the somewhat plausible assertion that the Colombian 
government would see parallel proceedings in the United States as “in-
trusive,” attaching a letter from the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Rela-
tions stating that “any decision in this case may affect the relations be-
tween Colombia and the [United States].”174 
From this plausible beginning, the submission advanced a series of in-
flated claims. According to the executive branch, the economic repercus-
sions of this single lawsuit seeking damages for an atrocity that had been 
condemned by both the U.S. and Colombian governments could be so 
grave that the lawsuit could undermine the stability of Colombia and of 
the region, weaken efforts to fight terrorists and drug traffickers, increase 
drug trafficking to the United States, endanger U.S. citizens in Colombia, 
and hinder the U.S. goal of achieving energy independence.175 
                                                                                                             
 170. Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
 171. Letter from William H. Taft, Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State at 1–2, Mujica v. Oc-
cidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (No. 03-2860). 
 172. 382 F. Supp. 2d at 1168. 
 173. Letter from William H. Taft, Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State at 1, Mujica v. Occi-
dental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (No. 03-2860). The sub-
mission does not, however, explore the extensive evidence indicating that fair proceed-
ings are not possible in Colombia. 
 174. Id. at 2. The letter did not address the likelihood that the Colombian government 
had little interest in actually investigating the incident or punishing those responsible. 
 175. Id. at 2. The district court dismissed the Mujica complaint in a decision that is 
pending on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. 
Supp. 2d 1164, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2005), appeal docketed, No. 05-56056 (9th Cir. July 21, 
2005). But in its decision, the lower court did not rely on the executive’s exaggerated 
claims that litigation of the case could endanger U.S. national security and the security of 
the entire Andean region. That is, the court implicitly rejected as unreasonable the execu-
tive branch’s broad claims. Instead, the court focused on the factors relevant to the politi-
cal question doctrine and found one narrow conflict. The court noted that “the Executive 
has indicated that it wishes to pursue non-judicial methods of remedying the wrongs 
committed in Santo Domingo.” Id. at 1194 n.25. As a result, it concluded that “[f]urther 
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The cascading lists of catastrophic consequences in both the Exxon 
Mobil and Mujica letters are not just unreasonable. They are patently 
absurd. Given that litigants, experts, and the judges themselves have ac-
cess today to a wide range of information about each of the topics men-
tioned in these letters, the courts may be more willing than previously to 
question the administration’s unsupported conclusions. 
The implausibility of these arguments is underscored by the fact that 
prior administrations did not suggest that human rights litigation in U.S. 
courts would pose a threat to U.S. national security. Furthermore, when 
the Bush administration has raised concerns about the economic impact 
of U.S. litigation in other areas, the tone of its submissions is measured 
and, therefore, more credible. In an amicus brief in a case concerning 
enforcement of antitrust measures, the Bush administration explained 
that U.S. allies viewed some civil antitrust litigation in U.S. courts as 
“inappropriate,” leading to “tension with our trading partners.”176 These 
tensions, the amicus brief suggests, might “undermine the cooperative 
relationships that this Nation’s antitrust agencies have forged with their 
foreign counterparts in recent years,” leading to less effective interna-
tional enforcement efforts.177 The brief limits its rhetoric to the reason-
able dangers to antitrust enforcement, with no allegation that tensions 
with our trading partners might lead to a cascading series of uncontrolla-
ble economic, political, and military harms. 
C. Ill-Supported Economic Claims 
The executive branch submissions argue that civil lawsuits against cor-
porations for abuses committed in foreign countries trigger severe eco-
nomic consequences that undermine U.S. government policies. 
1. Deterrence of U.S. Foreign Investment 
The administration’s economic arguments rely on the unexplored as-
sumption that ATS litigation will deter U.S.-based corporations from 
investing in countries with troubled human rights records. The argument 
assumes that diminished investment by U.S. business will then trigger 
several undesirable results: economic stagnation in the foreign country, 
                                                                                                             
adjudication of this case would constitute disagreement with this prior foreign policy 
decision.” Id. If the Ninth Circuit follows the approach to executive branch submissions 
adopted by the Sarei panel, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), it is likely to reverse this dis-
missal. 
 176. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 21–22, F. 
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724). 
 177. Id. at 22. 
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reduced profits for U.S. companies, and replacement of U.S. corporations 
with investors from other countries who are both less economically effi-
cient and more likely to abuse human rights. 
Most ATS cases, however, involve the extractive industries. Corpora-
tions that are involved in extracting natural resources such as oil, gas, 
and minerals cannot choose where to invest.178 Economic analysis of the 
impact of tort litigation on trade and investment often makes the mistake 
of assuming that corporations can freely enter and exit the relevant mar-
ket, an assumption that does not apply to the extractive industries.179 
Corporations that have already made a significant investment in oil, gas, 
or mining operations in a foreign country are unlikely to abandon that 
investment in the face of liability suits. Nor are they likely to be replaced 
by corporations with lower costs: once they have begun their operations, 
they are likely to maintain a significant advantage over competitors that 
are not already heavily invested in the particular locale.180 
It is also possible that corporations considering investments in foreign 
countries will adopt policies designed to deter complicity in gross human 
rights violations. When the issues are as stark as genocide and torture, 
non-economic factors may have some influence; basic decency suggests 
that some percentage of corporations would prefer to avoid providing 
knowing, substantial support of genocide and torture.181 In any event, if 
                                                                                                             
 178. In the memorable words of Vice President Dick Cheney, “The problem is that the 
good Lord didn’t see fit to always put oil and gas resources where there are democratic 
governments.” Halliburton’s Cheney Sees Worldwide Opportunities, Blasts Sanctions, 
PETROLEUM FINANCE WEEK (Apr. 1, 1996), quoted in Richard Herz, The Liberalizing 
Effects of Tort: How Corporate Complicity Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute Ad-
vances Constructive Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. (forthcoming 2008) (manu-
script at 1, on file with Author). 
 179. See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, Transnational Tort Litigation as a Trade and Investment 
Issue (Stanford Law Sch. and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 331, 2007), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=956668. Sykes concludes that imposing higher tort obligations 
on some, but not all, multinational corporations will increase the costs of the most effi-
cient, lowest cost firms, and that they will be replaced by less efficient, higher cost com-
panies that have lower tort standards. Id. at 27. He includes ATS claims in this analysis. 
Id. at 4. Sykes’ analysis, however, explicitly assumes free entry and exit into the market, 
id. at 16, despite the fact that almost all of his human rights examples concern the extrac-
tive industry. Id. at 29–31. 
 180. See id. at 23 n.20 (Sykes acknowledges that his conclusions may not apply if 
companies facing higher standards maintain their cost advantage even with the extra costs 
imposed by those standards.). 
 181. As Sykes notes, “competitors may gain little cost advantage if their own ethical 
principles lead them to refrain from similar behavior.” Id. at 31. Moreover, he concludes 
that egregious human rights abuses “may present instances in which a welfarist perspec-
tive is simply unpersuasive, involving alleged conduct that many observers believe 
should be sanctioned irrespective of the economic consequences.” Id. See also Jack L. 
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U.S. business executives see lucrative investment opportunities in coun-
tries governed by abusive regimes, they might first seek ways to avoid 
complicity in abuses, rather than forgoing profitable investments. 
The executive branch assumes that the risk of human rights liability 
will lead U.S. corporations to divest because such liability will impose 
significant additional costs, putting U.S. business at a competitive disad-
vantage.182 But the costs of ATS litigation are relatively minor compared 
to the profit potential in overseas markets. In addition, with increased 
international focus on human rights abuses and corporate responsibility, 
corporations might find that rights-protective policies provide a competi-
tive edge. A special report in the Economist in early 2008 reached ex-
actly this conclusion about corporate social responsibility programs: 
“[D]one badly, [corporate social responsibility] is often just a figleaf and 
can be positively harmful. Done well, though, it is not some separate ac-
tivity that companies do on the side, a corner of corporate life reserved 
for virtue: it is just good business.”183 
2. Undercutting U.S. Constructive Engagement 
The administration also asserts that human rights lawsuits undermine 
the executive branch’s decision to use “constructive engagement” to 
promote reform. In an argument repeated in several corporate-defendant 
cases, the executive branch asserts that the “policy determination of 
whether to pursue a constructive engagement policy is precisely the type 
of foreign affairs question that is constitutionally vested in the Executive 
Branch and over which the courts lack institutional authority and ability 
to decide.”184 This statement by itself is uncontroversial. The administra-
tion proceeds, however, to a less obvious assertion that ATS accountabil-
ity undermines the policy of constructive engagement, defined as U.S. 
efforts “to promote active economic engagement as a method of encour-
                                                                                                             
Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, Lex Loci Delictus and Global Economic Welfare: Spinozzi 
v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1146 (2007) (complaining that “ATS 
suits function in effect as a discriminatory tax on U.S. corporations that operate in foreign 
jurisdictions,” but recognizing that “[t]his burden may seem of little moment when claims 
of ethnic cleansing, genocide, torture, and the like are at stake”). 
 182. See Russell J. Weintraub, International Litigation and Forum Non Conveniens, 29 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 321, 352 (1994) (stating that litigation against U.S. corporations for 
abuses committed in other countries “places our companies at a world-wide competitive 
disadvantage”). 
 183. Corporate Social Responsibility: Just Good Business, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 
2008, http://www.economist.com/business/displayStory.cfm?story_id=10491077. 
 184. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14, Khulumani v. Barclay National 
Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (Nos. 05-2141, 05-2326). 
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aging reform and gaining leverage.”185 As explained at length in a forth-
coming article, the administration does not support its far-from-obvious 
conclusion that litigation undermines constructive engagement.186 To the 
contrary, litigation might well complement a constructive engagement 
approach. Constructive engagement is based on the assumption that U.S.-
based corporate investors will promote human rights and democracy.187 
A corporation that is complicit in genocide, summary execution, or tor-
ture offers nothing to the pursuit of constructive engagement, because its 
“engagement” is not “constructive.” 
The executive submissions assert that holding corporations accountable 
for human rights abuses will discourage companies committed to protect-
ing human rights from investing in abusive regimes,188 but it makes no 
effort to explain why this is true. Rather, such accountability levels the 
playing field for those who are truly committed to constructive engage-
ment. 
D. A Perceived Bias Toward Corporate Interests 
Finally, the Bush administration was from the start viewed as closely 
allied with corporate interests. As a result, the courts may well have con-
sidered the (questionable) submissions in corporate-defendant cases with 
extra suspicion. The tone of those submissions only fuels the concern 
that they are an effort to protect the interests of the administration’s cor-
porate allies, rather than a reflection of well-reasoned foreign policy con-
cerns. 
 
* * * * 
 
In summary, the views that the Bush administration has offered in cor-
porate-defendant human rights cases were not reasonable because their 
conclusions were not well-connected to the established doctrines, were 
not well-founded, and failed to provide supporting evidence. The result 
was not surprising: the courts refused to defer to their unreasonable con-
cerns. 
                                                                                                             
 185. Id. See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Doe v. Unocal 
Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628). 
 186. Herz, supra note 178 (manuscript at 3, on file with Author). 
 187. “Engagement theory assumes that companies will, through example and interac-
tion, convey democratic values.” Id. at 1 (article abstract). 
 188. See Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 297 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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CONCLUSION 
U.S. judges are keenly aware of their constitutional obligation to re-
spect the foreign affairs powers of the executive branch. They are equally 
concerned with their constitutional obligation to exercise independent 
judgment when determining whether they should dismiss cases that are 
otherwise properly before them because of foreign affairs concerns 
raised by the executive branch. In a remarkable break from recent his-
tory, the courts have rejected a significant number of Bush administra-
tion suggestions that corporate-defendant ATS cases endanger U.S. for-
eign policy. A close look at those cases makes clear that the shift is not 
the result of a change in the way the courts have exercised their author-
ity, but rather a judicious recognition that the Bush administration views 
are unreasonable, and therefore undeserving of deference.  
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APPENDIX A 
OVERVIEW OF ALIEN TORT STATUTE CASES, 1789–PRESENT 
 
Before the Second Circuit’s decision in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), twenty-one reported cases alleged jurisdiction 
under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), with only two upholding the 
claims.189 Since Filártiga, approximately 185 cases have been litigated 
under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) or the closely related Torture Vic-
tim Protection Act (“TVPA”). A large majority of the post-Filártiga 
cases—about 123—have been finally dismissed, most often because of 
the immunity of the defendants or the failure to state an actionable viola-
tion of international law. Another nineteen have been dismissed but are 
currently on appeal. Approximately twenty-four have resulted in settle-
ments or judgments for the plaintiffs and nineteen are currently pending. 
These numbers are not exact because some cases may not appear on 
public databases and many cases assert claims on multiple grounds. The 
totals are also misleading in that they include all identifiable cases as-
serting an ATS claim, including many in which the claim is clearly un-
founded. Several cases, for example, were filed under the ATS on behalf 
of a U.S. citizen, despite the statute’s explicit limitation to claims by 
aliens. Others assert violations of domestic law that clearly do not satisfy 
the statute’s requirement of a tort “committed in violation of the law of 
nations.” 
These totals do not include cases filed under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976 exception for claims against “state sponsors of 
terrorism,”190 or the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996,191 although such cases often include ATS or TVPA claims. The 
tally also does not include cases arising out of injuries inflicted during 
World War II because they raise distinct issues.192 
                                                                                                             
 189. For a list of the pre-Filártiga cases, see Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction 
Over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Claims Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 1, 4–5 nn.15–17 (1985). 
 190. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2008) (formerly codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)).  
 191. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2339C (2008). 
 192. World War II cases arise out of wartime acts committed over sixty years ago; 
moreover, the U.S. government entered into peace agreements that are often interpreted 
as governing claims for compensation. As a result, issues concerning the statute of limita-
tions, standing to sue, act of state, and political question are often quite different from 
those arising from more recent events. See generally STEPHENS, supra note 18, at 543–50 
(discussing issues that arise in human rights litigation based upon historical injustices). 
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Pre-Filártiga (1789–1980): 21 Cases 
From 1789, when the ATS was enacted, until the Filártiga decision in 
1980, twenty-one cases asserted jurisdiction under the ATS, resulting in 
two judgments for plaintiffs. 
From Filártiga to Sosa (1980–2004): 81 Cases 
From 1980 to 2004, approximately eighty-one cases asserted jurisdic-
tion under the ATS or the TVPA, resulting in one settlement, eleven 
judgments for plaintiffs, and sixty-nine dismissals. 
Post-Sosa (2004–2008): 104 Cases 
From the time of the 2004 Sosa decision until January 2008, the federal 
courts issued decisions in approximately 104 cases asserting jurisdiction 
under the ATS or the TVPA, with the following results: 
 
Settlement 4 
Judgment For Plaintiff 8 
Dismissed 73 
     Final 54  
     On Appeal 19  
Pending in a District Court 19 
     Survived Preliminary Motions 12  
     No Decision Yet 7  
Post-Sosa Cases by Defendants 
Approximately one third of the post-Sosa cases involve claims against 
the U.S. government, U.S. or local government officials, and/or U.S. 
government contractors. All of the ATS and TVPA cases against the U.S. 
government or its employees have been dismissed, although one pending 
case against a government contractor did survive a preliminary motion to 
dismiss.193 
                                                                                                             
 193. Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., Nos. 04-1248, 05-1165, 2007 WL 3274784 (D.D.C. Nov. 
6, 2007) (claim for mistreatment of prisoners held by the U.S. military). The decision 
addresses consolidated suits against two contractors—Titan Corporation and CACI Pre-
mier Technologies. Id. at 1. The district court dismissed the claim against Titan Corpora-
tion, which provided interpreters to the U.S. military, but denied the motion to dismiss 
the claims against CACI, which provided interrogators to the U.S. military. Id. at 1, 9. 
The court had earlier dismissed the international law claims against both defendants, 
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Approximately one third of the post-Sosa cases involve corporate de-
fendants. Of the remaining post-Sosa cases, those against foreign gov-
ernments have been dismissed on the basis of foreign sovereign immu-
nity. Many cases have been dismissed for failure to allege an actionable 
violation of international law. 
Only about ten percent of the post-Sosa cases—about a dozen—fall 
into the mold of the Filártiga case, in which an individual sues an indi-
vidual defendant who is present in the United States alleging a human 
rights violation that occurred outside of the United States. All but one of 
the cases resulting in final judgments for plaintiffs were from this indi-
vidual-defendant category.194 
 
                                                                                                             
permitting only state law tort claims to proceed. Id. In a handful of the cases included in 
these numbers, the courts have similarly dismissed the federal law claims but permitted 
the cases to proceed as diversity actions seeking state tort remedies. See, e.g., Doe v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 28–29 (D.D.C. 2005).  
 194. The exception is Jama v. Esmor Corr. Serv. (No. 97-03093), 2008 WL 724337 
(D.N.J. Dec. 7, 2007), in which a jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Id. at 1. Several 
additional plaintiffs settled shortly before trial. Id. 
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APPENDIX B 
 CORPORATE DEFENDANT HUMAN RIGHTS CASES 
 
In 1997, Doe v. Unocal Corp. found that a corporation could be held 
liable under the ATS for certain claims, including those that do not re-
quire state action (e.g., genocide, slavery, and war crimes) and those in 
which the corporate defendant is complicit in violations committed by 
state actors.195 All twenty-four corporate-defendant ATS cases decided 
prior to Unocal were dismissed. Post-Unocal, approximately fifty-two 
international human rights cases involving corporate defendants have 
been litigated (not including cases addressing abuses committed during 
World War II, which raise unique issues). Of the fifty-two, thirty-three 
have been dismissed (appeals of nine of the dismissals are still pending), 
fifteen are still pending in a federal trial court, three have settled, and in 
one, a jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Of the fifteen pending 
cases, nine have survived preliminary motions to dismiss, although in 
three of those, all of the international law claims have been dismissed 
(state law claims are still pending). One dismissal has been reversed and 
remanded to the district court. The remaining five cases were filed re-
cently and await rulings on preliminary motions. 
The table below provides data on the principle dispositions of ATS 
human rights cases with corporate defendants. A list of all of the cases, 
with citations, follows the table.  
Note that cases with numerous defendants are included if one of the 
defendants is a corporation. Cases arising out of related events are 
counted as a single case, including, for instance, multiple cases arising 
out of the attacks of September 11, 2001, and multiple cases seeking 
damages from firms based on their involvement with the Apartheid re-
gime in South Africa. The nine cases against corporations stemming 
from World War II are treated as a separate category because the issues 
they raise are so distinct. Keep in mind that any count is tentative, given 
that it may omit claims that are filed and dismissed without appearing on 
public databases. Many of the dismissed cases on this list failed because 
they were filed with no arguable international human rights violation.196 
 
                                                                                                             
 195. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
 196. See, e.g., Ganguly v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 2004 WL 213016, at *6–7 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2004), aff’d, 142 Fed. Appx. 498 (2d Cir. 2004) (foreign investor seek-
ing to hold brokerage firm liable for losses failed to allege any violation of international 
law). 
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Total Corporate Defendant Cases 1960 to Present (85) 
Pre-Unocal (pre-1996) (24)  
Pre-Filártiga (pre-
1980) 
Dismissed 12  
Post-Filártiga and 
Pre-Unocal (1980–
1996) 
Dismissed 12 
 
Post-Unocal (post-1996) (61) 
World War II Claims  9 
Non–World War II 
Claims 
 52 
 Verdict for Plaintiff 1  
 Settled 3  
 Dismissed Total 33  
      On Appeal 9   
      Final 24   
 Pending 15  
      Survived Preliminary       Motion 
6   
 
     Federal Action Dis- 
     missed, State Law  
     Claim Pending 
3 
  
      Dismissal Reversed       and Remanded 
1   
      Decision Pending 5   
 
The following lists provide citations for each of the cases tabulated 
above. For cases with multiple decisions, citations are to the decision 
dismissing the case, the latest significant decision, or the latest decision 
from an appellate court. Cases are listed in chronological order within 
each category, starting with the earliest decisions. 
Pre-Filártiga (1960–1979)—All Dismissed (12) 
Khedivial Line v. Seafarers’ Int’l Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960) 
Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963) 
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Upper Lakes Shipping Ltd. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Assn., 293 F. Supp. 
207 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) 
Seth v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 329 F.2d 302 (1st Cir. 1964) 
Damaskinos v. Societa Navigacion InterAm., 255 F. Supp. 919 
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) 
Valanga v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1966) 
Abiodun v. Martin Oil Serv. Inc., 475 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1973) 
IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) 
Papageorgiou v. Lloyds of London, 436 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. Pa. 1977) 
Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978) 
Akbar v. New York Magazine Co., 490 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C.1980) 
Soultanoglou v. Liberty Trans. Co., No. 75-2259, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
9177 (S.D.N.Y.) 
Filártiga to Unocal (1980–1996)—All Dismissed (12) 
Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
Trans-Continental Inv. Corp. v. Bank of Commonwealth, 500 F. Supp. 
565 (C.D. Cal.1980) 
B.T. Shanker Hedge v. British Airways, No. 82-1410, 1982 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16469 (N.D. Ill.) 
De Wit v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 570 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) 
Canadian Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compania de Acero, 727 F.2d 274 (2d 
Cir. 1984) 
Munusamy v. McClelland Eng’r, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. Tex. 1984) 
Tamari v. Bache & Co., 730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir. 1984) 
Jaffe v. Boyles, 616 F. Supp. 1371 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) 
Carmichael v. United Tech. Corp., 835 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1988) 
Jones v. Petty-Ray Geophysical Geosource, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 343 (S.D. 
Tex. 1989) 
Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1995) 
Post-Unocal Cases (Post-1996) 
World War II Cases (9) 
Burger-Fischer v. DeGussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999) 
Friedman v. Bayer Corp., No. 99-3675, 1999 WL 33457825 (E.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 15, 1999) 
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999) 
Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) 
Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) 
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Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer, 389 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 
2004) 
Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. 2005) 
Arndt v. UBS AG, 342 F. Supp. 2d 132 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003) (consolidated with 
In Re WWII Era Japanese Forced Labor, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. 
Cal. 2000)) 
Non–World War II Cases Organized By Status (52) 
Jury Verdict for One Plaintiff/Other Plaintiffs Settled (1) 
Jama v. Esmor Corr. Serv., Civ. No. 97-03093, 2008 WL 724337 (D.N.J. 
Dec. 7, 2007) 
Settled (3) 
Does v. The Gap, Inc., No. 01-0031, 2003 WL 22997250 (D. N.Mar. I. 
Sept. 11, 2003) 
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) 
Xiaoning v. Yahoo! Inc., Civ. No. 07-02151 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2007) 
Pending in District Court, International Claims Survived Preliminary 
Motions (6) 
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) 
In Re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) 
Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. 99-02506, 2007 WL 2349341 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 14, 2007) 
Arias v. Dyncorp, 517 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2007) 
Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988 (S.D. Ind. 2007) 
Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) 
Pending in District Court, International Claims Dismissed but State 
Claims Pending (3) 
Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 448 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2006) 
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2007), petition for 
cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3050 (U.S. July 20, 2007) (No. 07-81)  
Ibrahim v. Titan Corp. & CACI, Nos. 04-1248, 05-1165, 2007 WL 
3274784 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2007) 
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Pending in District Court (Dismissal Reversed on Appeal) (1) 
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd. (In re So. Afr. Apartheid Litig.), 
504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), aff'd due to lack of a quorum sub nom., 
American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 2008 WL 117862, 76 
U.S.L.W. 3405 (May 12, 2008) (No. 07-919)  
Pending in District Court, No Decision Yet (5) 
Doe v. Nestle, Civ. No. 05-5133 (C.D. Cal., filed July 14, 2005) 
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Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., No. 07-2798 (N.D. Cal. filed May 
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2005) 
Turedi v. Coca-Cola Co., 460 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
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Lost After Jury Trial, on Appeal (1) 
Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., No. 7:02-00665 (N.D. Ala. July 
26, 2007) 
Dismissed, Final (24) 
In Re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005), aff’d on other grounds, Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent 
Orange v. Dow, 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008)  
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APPENDIX C 
 EXECUTIVE BRANCH SUBMISSIONS IN CORPORATE DEFENDANT CASES 
 
This Appendix features non–World War II corporate-defendant ATS 
cases in which the U.S. government has submitted a letter, statement of 
interest, declaration, or amicus brief. The following provides a list of 
cases with citations and summaries. 
1. Arias v. Dyncorp, 517 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2007) 
Plaintiffs sued Dyncorp for physical harm and property damage caused 
when pesticides sprayed in Colombia, pursuant to a contract with the 
U.S. government to eradicate cocaine and heroine farms in Colombia, 
drifted across the border into Ecuador. The court dismissed the claim for 
torture but denied the motions to dismiss and for summary judgment on 
the additional international law claims.197 
The administration submitted a declaration from the Assistant Secre-
tary of State for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforce-
ment Affairs that stated that the litigation posed a national security risk: 
“United States counter-narcotics policy in Columbia and the Andean Re-
gion is a product of a complicated U.S. national security and foreign pol-
icy objectives that cannot be addressed in any private litigation.”198 A 
strongly worded, detailed, eleven-page declaration asserted that the liti-
gation “poses grave risks to U.S. national security interests, foreign pol-
icy objectives and diplomatic relations in the Andean Region.”199 The 
declaration stated that: 
The Arias plaintiffs challenge an aerial drug eradication program that 
has been repeatedly authorized by the executive and legislative 
branches after extensive deliberation as a key element in U.S. counter-
narcotics strategy. Any disruption of this program would cripple United 
States efforts to stem the flow of narcotics into this country, provide a 
financial boon to international terrorist organizations that have targeted 
U.S. interests, and significantly undermine the prospects of strong and 
stable relations between the United States and Colombia and other An-
dean nations. The stakes are high.200 
                                                                                                             
 197. Arias v. Dyncorp, 517 F. Supp. at 230–31. 
 198. Declaration of Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Int’l 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Regarding Potential Impact of Arias Litigation 
on the United States Nat’l Sec. and Foreign Policy Interests at 1–2, Arias v. DynCorp, 
517 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 01-1980). 
 199. Id. at 10. 
 200. Id. at 10–11. 
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The court refused to dismiss the case, holding that the claim did not 
challenge the executive branch foreign policies or the implementation of 
those policies, because “the intended means of executing the policy in 
this case did not include the acts challenged here, which plaintiffs allege 
were specifically prohibited by the plan.”201 
2. Bowoto v. Chevron, Civ. No. 03-417580 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 20, 
2003) 
Nigerian plaintiffs filed both federal and state lawsuits seeking injunc-
tive relief and damages for a series of military attacks on civilians in Ni-
geria, claiming that the defendant was liable for injuries inflicted by the 
government security forces. In the state court action, the judge requested 
the views of the State Department. But the federal court declined the de-
fendant’s request that it seek the views of the executive branch.202 
The administration filed a Statement of Interest203 in the state case lim-
ited to one issue, stating that the court should not issue an injunction or-
dering the defendant to comply with the Voluntary Principles on Security 
and Human Rights because such an order “could have a chilling effect on 
the continued participation of corporate entities in this effort and, thus, 
would interfere with an important foreign policy initiative of the Federal 
Government.”204 
The state court has not yet ruled on the issue raised by the submission. 
3. Corrie v. Caterpillar, 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) 
The family of a peace activist who was run over and killed by a mili-
tary bulldozer in the Gaza Strip and a number of Palestinians who lived 
in the Gaza Strip and West Bank brought this action against the manufac-
turer of bulldozers used by Israeli Defense Forces to destroy homes of 
Palestinians. The district court granted a motion to dismiss, which was 
upheld by the Ninth Circuit on political question grounds.205 
                                                                                                             
 201. Arias, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 225. 
 202. Letter of John B. Bellinger, Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State, attached to Statement 
of Interest of the United States at 1, Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. 03-417580 (Super. Ct. 
Cal. May 29, 2007); Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., No. 99 Civ. 2506, at 3–5 (N.D. 
Cal. July 30, 2004) (Order Denying Motion for Court to Request Views). 
 203. Statement of Interest of the United States, Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. 03-
417580 (Super. Ct. Cal. May 29, 2007). 
 204. Id. at 2. 
 205. Corrie v. Caterpillar, 503 F.3d 974, 997 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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The executive branch filed an amicus curiae brief in the appeal,206 ar-
guing against extraterritorial application of the ATS and against recogni-
tion of ATS aiding and abetting liability, and asserting that the claims in 
this case would interfere with executive branch foreign policies. The ex-
ecutive branch urged the courts to be “very hesitant” to recognize ATS 
claims by foreign citizens for abuses committed outside the United 
States.207 It stated that: 
The adoption of an aiding-and-abetting rule . . . would in numerous . . . 
circumstances . . . implicate and limit the United States’ foreign policy 
prerogatives. One important policy option for dealing with a foreign 
country is to promote active economic engagement in that country as a 
method of encouraging reform and gaining leverage with that country. 
The determination whether to pursue such a policy is the type of for-
eign affairs question constitutionally vested in the Executive Branch. . . 
. Judicial imposition of aiding-and-abetting liability under Section 1350 
would undermine the Executive’s ability to employ economic engage-
ment as an effective tool for foreign policy.208 
Aiding and abetting liability, the executive branch argued, would “spur 
more lawsuits, resulting in greater diplomatic friction,” and “[s]erious 
diplomatic friction can lead to a lack of cooperation with the United 
States Government on important foreign policy objectives.”209 
It also warned that “[p]ermitting this type of suit to proceed would di-
rectly challenge the national security determination of the political 
branches to fund” sales of defense articles to select countries and “neces-
sarily implicate the foreign policy” decision to provide funding to Israel 
for these sales.210 
The Ninth Circuit dismissed on the basis of the political question doc-
trine, but did not reach the other issues raised by the executive branch. 
4. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2007), petition for 
cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3050 (Jul 20, 2007) (No. 07-81) 
Indonesian villagers brought suit against Exxon for injuries caused by 
a company security force comprised of members of the Indonesian mili-
tary. 
                                                                                                             
 206. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in support of Affirmance, Corrie v. 
Caterpillar, No. 05–036210 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2006). 
 207. Id. at 5. 
 208. Id. at 16–17 (citations omitted). 
 209. Id. at 18. 
 210. Id. at 27. 
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The State Department filed a letter211 with the court stating that Indo-
nesia would perceive the lawsuit as “interference” in its internal affairs, 
and it would therefore decrease cooperation with the United States on a 
range of issues, including counter-terrorism initiatives.212 The letter sug-
gested that the case would lead to decreased foreign investment in Indo-
nesia, which could undermine the stability of the Indonesian government, 
and that an unstable Indonesia “could create problems ranging from in-
terruption in vital shipping lanes, to refugee outflows, to a new home for 
terrorists.”213 Specifically, the State Department predicted that if U.S. 
corporations pulled out in response to litigation, business competitors 
from other nations might take their place,214 and that adjudication of the 
case could undermine Indonesia’s economic and political stability and 
the security of the entire region, thereby “risk[ing] a potentially serious 
adverse impact on significant interests of the United States, including 
interests related directly to the on-going struggle against international 
terrorism.”215 However, the letter acknowledged that these views were 
speculative, based on problems that might develop during the course of 
the lawsuit: “Much of this assessment is necessarily predictive and con-
tingent on how the case might unfold in the course of litigation,” includ-
ing the “intrusiveness of discovery” and the extent to which the case re-
quired “judicial pronouncements on the official actions of the [Govern-
ment of Indonesia] with respect to the conduct of its military activities in 
Aceh.216 
The district court dismissed the federal law claims, but refused to dis-
miss the state common law tort claims, although it imposed limits on dis-
covery designed to avoid intrusion into Indonesian sovereignty.217 De-
fendants sought a writ of mandamus from the D.C. Circuit; the circuit 
denied the request.218 The court stated: 
We disagree with Exxon’s contention that there is a conflict be-
tween the views of the State Department and those of the district court. 
. . . [T]he State Department [letter] noted that adjudication of the plain-
tiffs’ claims would “risk a potentially serious adverse impact on sig-
nificant interests of the United States.” However, the letter also con-
                                                                                                             
 211. Letter from William H. Taft, Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State, Doe v. Exxon Mobil, 
393 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005) (No. 01-1357). 
 212. Id. at 2–3. 
 213. Id. at 3–4. 
 214. Id. at 3. 
 215. Id. at 1. 
 216. Id. at 2 n.1. 
 217. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 29–30 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 218. 473 F.3d 345, 354 (D.D.C 2007).  
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tained several important qualifications. It noted that the effects of this 
suit on U.S. foreign policy interests “cannot be determined with cer-
tainty.” Moreover, the letter stated that its assessment of the litigation 
was “necessarily predictive and contingent on how the case might un-
fold in the course of litigation.” Most importantly, the State Department 
emphasized that whether this case would adversely affect U.S. foreign 
policy depends upon “the nature, extent, and intrusiveness of discov-
ery.” We interpret the State Department’s letter not as an unqualified 
opinion that this suit must be dismissed, but rather as a word of caution 
to the district court alerting it to the State Department’s concerns. . . . 
Thus, we need not decide what level of deference would be owed to a 
letter from the State Department that unambiguously requests that the 
district court dismiss a case as a non-justiciable political question.219 
Judge Kavanaugh, who served as a legal advisor to President Bush be-
fore being appointed to the D.C. Circuit, dissented. 
5. Doe v. Unocal, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) 
Burmese citizens sued seeking damages for human rights violations 
committed by the Burmese military in furtherance of a joint natural gas 
pipeline project. A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
dismissal of the claims, holding that plaintiffs had sufficient evidence 
that the defendant bore legal responsibility for its involvement in the 
abuses.220 The Ninth Circuit then agreed to a hearing en banc, but the 
parties settled and the case was dismissed.221 
The U.S. government filed amicus briefs in May 2003 and August 
2004,222 arguing that ATS claims involved the judiciary in “matters that 
by their nature should be left to the political [b]ranches”223 because for-
eign affairs “are of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither the apti-
                                                                                                             
 219. Id. at 354. Judge Kavanaugh rejected the majority’s reading of the State Depart-
ment’s views as ambiguous, stating that “the State Department unambiguously stated to 
the District Court that, for multiple reasons, ‘adjudication of this lawsuit at this time 
would in fact risk a potentially serious adverse impact on significant interests of the 
United States, including interests related directly to the on-going struggle against interna-
tional terrorism.’” Id. at 363 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 220. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F. 3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). For the full procedural his-
tory of the case, see supra note 32. 
 221. Unocal, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (post-settlement order granting the parties’ stipulated motion to dismiss and 
vacating the district court decision on the motion for summary judgment). 
 222. Brief for the United States, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628); Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628). 
 223. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 
708 (9th Cir. 2005) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628). 
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tude, facilities nor responsibility.”224 The government made the following 
statements in support of their position: 
Wide-ranging claims the courts have entertained regarding the acts 
of aliens in foreign countries necessarily call upon our courts to render 
judgments over matters that implicate our Nation’s foreign affairs. In 
the view of the United States, the assumption of this role by the courts 
under the ATS not only has no historical basis, but, more important, 
raises significant potential for serious interference with the important 
foreign policy interests of the United States, and is contrary to our con-
stitutional framework and democratic principles.225 
 . . . . 
[T]he types of claims being asserted today under the ATS are fraught 
with foreign policy implications . . . [which have] serious implications 
for our current war against terrorism, and permit[] ATS claims to be as-
serted against our allies in that war226 . . . [and against] the United 
States itself in connection with its efforts to combat terrorism.227 
. . . . 
[T]he ATS thus places the courts in the wholly inappropriate role of ar-
biters of foreign conduct, including international law enforcement.228 
The Supplemental Brief makes the additional argument that embracing 
“aiding and abetting” liability for ATS claims creates economic uncer-
tainty that could hamper the government’s ability to “promote active 
economic engagement as a method of encouraging reform and gaining 
leverage,” deterring businesses from investments because of uncertainty 
concerning private liability and protracted litigation.229 The Supplemental 
Brief also argued that there would be negative consequences for the ex-
ecutive branch’s ability to advance its diplomatic agenda:230 
Adopting aiding and abetting liability under the ATS would, in essence, 
be depriving the Executive of an important tactic of diplomacy and 
available tools for the political branches in attempting to induce im-
provements in foreign human rights practices. The selection of the ap-
propriate tools, and the proper balance between rewards and sanctions, 
                                                                                                             
 224. Id. at 21. 
 225. Id. at 3–4. 
 226. Id. at 22. 
 227. Id. at 22. 
 228. Id. at 23. 
 229. Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, Doe v. Unocal 
Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628). 
 230. Id. 
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requires policymaking judgment properly left to the federal political 
branches.231 
In addition, the government argued that ATS suits against corporate 
defendants based on aiding and abetting liability “would inevitably lead 
to greater diplomatic friction” and “trigger foreign government pro-
tests,”232 and that “[t]his can and already has led to a lack of cooperation 
on important foreign policy objectives.”233 
Finally, ATS aiding and abetting liability can deter “the free flow of 
trade and investment” in other countries and in the United States.234 
The Ninth Circuit sitting en banc did not resolve these issues because 
the parties settled the cases. 
6. In Re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d on other grounds, Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of 
Agent Orange v. Dow Chemical Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008) 
Vietnamese citizens who were harmed by Agent Orange and similar 
herbicides manufactured by the defendants and used by the U.S. military 
during the Vietnam War sued for damages, alleging that the use of the 
toxic chemical constituted a war crime. 
The extensive Statement of Interest filed in the district court argued 
that adjudication of the claims would intrude on the president’s constitu-
tional power to conduct war, the use of Agent Orange did not violate in-
ternational law norms at the time, and the defendants were protected by 
the government contractor defense.235 The submission also argued that 
the courts should defer to the executive branch’s determination that the 
acts at issue did not violate international law.236 These arguments were 
repeated in an amicus brief on appeal to the Second Circuit.237 
The district court rejected the argument that the claim was nonjusticia-
ble, but agreed that the use of Agent Orange in the 1960s did not violate 
a clearly established international law norm.238 The Second Circuit af-
firmed the dismissal, agreeing that the plaintiffs had not established a 
                                                                                                             
 231. Id. at 14–15. 
 232. Id. at 15–16. 
 233. Id. at 16. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Statement of Interest of the United States, In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 
MDL 381, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 04-400). 
 236. In Re Agent Orange Product Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 43–44 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
 237. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16–22, Vietnam Ass’n for Victims 
of Agent Orange v. Dow Chemical Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 05-1953). 
 238. In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 105. 
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violation of the law at the relevant time; the appellate court did not reach 
other issues decided by the district court, including justiciability under 
the political question doctrine. 
7. Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 
2007), aff’d due to lack of a quorum sub nom., American Isuzu Motors, 
Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 2008 WL 117862, 76 U.S.L.W. 3405 (May 12, 2008) 
(No. 07-919)  
South Africans brought three lawsuits against dozens of corporations 
for damages stemming from the defendants’ operations in South Africa 
during the Apartheid regime. 
The executive branch filed a letter in the district court239 accompanied 
by a declaration from the South African government that asserted that 
adjudication of these cases would interfere with South Africa’s chosen 
means to respond to past wrongs and would discourage needed invest-
ment.240 The executive branch statement concurred in this assessment, 
asserting that the lawsuit would cause tension between the United States 
and South Africa and hamper the policy of encouraging positive change 
in developing countries through economic investment.241 
The district court declined to reach the political question issues, dis-
missing the case instead because it found that aiding and abetting liabil-
ity was not actionable under the ATS.242 On appeal, the administration 
submitted a brief urging that the Second Circuit affirm the lower court’s 
rejection of aiding and abetting liability as well as urging caution in rec-
ognizing extraterritorial claims under the ATS.243 The brief argued that 
recognizing “aiding and abetting” liability would interfere with the ex-
ecutive branch’s ability to employ policy options in repressive regimes, 
such as “active economic engagement as a method of encouraging re-
                                                                                                             
 239. Letter of William H. Taft IV, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, In re South African 
Apartheid Litigation, MDL No. 1499 (Oct. 30, 2003), cited in Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. 
Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), aff’d due to lack of a quorum sub nom., Ameri-
can Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 2008 WL 117862, 76 U.S.L.W. 3405 (May 12, 2008) 
(No. 07-919) (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 240. 504 F.3d at 300. 
 241. Id. at 297. 
 242. In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev’d, Khu-
lumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), aff’d due to lack of a 
quorum sub nom. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 2008 WL 117862, 76 
U.S.L.W. 3405 (May 12, 2008) (No. 07-919). 
 243. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, 27, Khulumani v. Barclay Na-
tional Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (Nos. 05-2141, 05-2326). 
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form and gaining leverage,”244 which would constitute an unconstitu-
tional interference in the powers of the executive branch: 
The policy determination whether to pursue constructive engagement 
policy is precisely the type of foreign affairs question that is constitu-
tionally vested in the Executive Branch and over which the courts lack 
institutional authority and ability to decide . . . . The selection of the 
appropriate tools, and the proper balance between rewards and sanc-
tions, requires difficult policymaking judgments that can be rendered 
only by the political branches.245 
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that aiding and abetting liability 
does trigger ATS jurisdiction, and remanded with instructions to permit 
plaintiffs to file an amended complaint. Given the likelihood of an 
amended complaint, the circuit refused to reach the political question 
issues. The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions for lack of a quorum, 
after four of the justices recused themselves.246 
8. Mujica v. Occidental, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (appeal 
pending) 
Colombian citizens brought an action against an oil company and pri-
vate security firm to recover for their personal injuries and for the deaths 
of family members during a bombing of the village by the Colombian 
military. 
The State Department submitted a letter247 asserting that the litigation 
“will have an adverse impact on the foreign policy interests of the United 
States,” given that the legal proceedings against the Colombian govern-
ment involving the underlying incidents were then-pending in the Co-
lombian legal system.248 The letter warned that “[d]uplicative proceed-
ings in U.S. courts second-guessing [Colombia’s actions] may be seen as 
unwarranted and intrusive” by the Colombian government, and may have 
“negative consequences” for U.S. relations with Colombia.249 In addition, 
lawsuits such as this one could deter U.S. investment in Colombia, which 
                                                                                                             
 244. Id. at 13. 
 245. Id. at 14, 16–17. 
   246. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), aff’d due to 
lack of a quorum sub nom., American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 2008 WL 117862, 
76 U.S.L.W. 3405 (May 12, 2008) (No. 07-919). 
 247. Letter from William H. Taft, Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State, Mujica v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (No. 03-2860). 
 248. Id. at 1. 
 249. Id. at 2. 
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could harm Colombia’s economy as well as negatively impact U.S. inter-
ests in Colombia and the region:250 
[S]uch downturns could damage the stability of Colombia, the Colom-
bian government’s U.S.-supported campaigns against terrorists and 
narcotics traffickers, regional security, our efforts to reduce the amount 
of drugs that reach the streets of the United States, promotion of the 
rule of law and human rights in Colombia, and protection of U.S. per-
sons, government facilities, and investments. Finally, reduced U.S. in-
vestment in Colombia’s oil industry may detract from the vital U.S. 
policy goal of expanding and diversifying our sources of imported 
oil.251 
The State Department letter attached a letter from the Colombian gov-
ernment stating that the case could affect relations between Colombia 
and the United States.252 
The district court dismissed based on the political question doctrine, 
holding that permitting the case to go forward would express lack of re-
spect for the executive branch’s preferred approach to the underlying 
incident and relations with Colombia in general, and would contradict 
the executive branch’s foreign policy decision to handle this matter 
through non-judicial means.253 That decision is currently on appeal. 
9. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 
2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (granting motion for summary judgment) (ap-
peal pending) 
Residents of southern Sudan sued a Canadian corporation seeking 
compensation for genocide, crimes against humanity, and other viola-
tions of international law. 
The State Department sent a Statement of Interest to the court with a 
diplomatic letter from the Canadian government attached that stated that 
the litigation infringed on the foreign relations of Canada and would 
have a “chilling effect” on Canadian firms engaged in Sudan.254 The U.S. 
Statement of Interest stated that it shared the Canadian government’s 
concerns and urged the court to take a narrow view of the ATS in order 
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to avoid such conflicts.255 The letter also expressed the department’s 
concerns about the dangers of taking an expansive interpretation of ATS 
jurisdiction and attached a copy of the Justice Department’s brief in Doe 
v. Unocal Corp.256 
The district court rejected the views of both the U.S. and Canadian 
governments, finding the Canadian government’s expressed concerns 
unpersuasive because there was no showing that the pending litigation 
would interfere with Canada’s foreign policy. The court opined that: 
While this Court may not question either the accuracy of the de-
scription of Canada’s foreign policy in its Letter, or the wisdom and ef-
fectiveness of that foreign policy, it remains appropriate to consider the 
degree to which that articulated foreign policy applies to this litigation. 
. . . This lawsuit does not concern a Canadian company exporting to 
and engaged in trade with the Sudan, but a Canadian company operat-
ing in the Sudan as an oil exploration and extraction business. More-
over, the allegations in this lawsuit concern participation in genocide 
and crimes against humanity, not trading activity. While there is no re-
quirement that a government’s letter must support its position with de-
tailed argument, where the contents of the letter suggest a lack of un-
derstanding about the nature of the claims in the ATS litigation, a court 
may take that into account in assessing the concerns expressed in the 
letter.  
  . . . 
  . . . [W]hile a court may decline to hear a lawsuit that may interfere 
with a State’s foreign policy, particularly when that foreign policy is 
designed to promote peace and reduce suffering, dismissal is only war-
ranted as a matter of international comity where the nexus between the 
lawsuit and that foreign policy is sufficiently apparent and the impor-
tance of the relevant foreign policy outweighs the public’s interest in 
vindicating the values advanced by the lawsuit. Even giving substantial 
deference to the Canada Letter, Talisman has not shown that dismissal 
of this action is appropriate.257 
The court concluded that there was no showing that the pending litiga-
tion would interfere with Canada’s foreign policy.258 The judge declined 
to defer to the position taken in the Statement of Interest and noted that 
the United States and other countries “retain a compelling interest in the 
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application of the international law proscribing atrocities such as geno-
cide and crimes against humanity.”259 
The case was later dismissed on a motion for summary judgment; ap-
peal of that dismissal is currently pending. 
10. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007) (rehearing en 
banc granted) 
Residents of Papua New Guinea (“PNG”) brought an ATS action 
against an international mining company, alleging that they and their 
family members were victims of international law violations in connec-
tion with operation of a copper mine in PNG.260 
The State Department filed a letter that described the peace and recon-
ciliation process in PNG and stated that the ongoing litigation “would 
risk a potentially serious adverse impact on the peace process and hence 
on the conduct of our foreign relations.”261 The State Department letter 
cites an attached letter from the government of PNG stating its objections 
to the litigation.262 
The district court dismissed the claim in deference to the views of the 
executive branch. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, noting that al-
though the judiciary should give “serious weight” to the views of the ex-
ecutive branch, the court was not bound to dismiss a case in the face of 
the executive branch’s foreign policy concerns.263 The court noted that 
the State Department had not specifically requested that the case be dis-
missed, and found the executive branch’s “guarded” comments an insuf-
ficient basis to do so:264 “Ultimately, it is our responsibility to determine 
whether a political question is present, rather than to dismiss on that 
ground simply because the Executive Branch expresses some hesitancy 
about a case proceeding.”265 The court stated that: 
[T]his case presents claims that relate to a foreign conflict in which the 
United States had little involvement (so far as the record demonstrates), 
and therefore that merely “touch[ ] foreign relations.” . . . When we 
take the [Statement of Interest (“SOI”)] into consideration and give it 
“serious weight,” we still conclude that a political question is not pre-
sented. Even if the continued adjudication of this case does present 
                                                                                                             
 259. Talisman, 2005 WL 2082846 at *7. 
 260. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 261. Letter from William H. Taft, Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State at 2, Sarei v. Rio 
Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (No. 00-11695). 
 262. Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1199. 
 263. Id. at 1205–07. 
 264. Id. at 1206–07. 
 265. Id. at 1205. 
2008] JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 831 
some risk to the Bougainville peace process, that is not sufficient to 
implicate the . . . Baker factors . . . . The State Department explicitly 
did not request that we dismiss this suit on political question grounds, 
and we are confident that proceeding does not express any disrespect 
for the executive, even if it would prefer that the suit disappear. Nor do 
we see any “unusual need for unquestioning adherence” to the SOI’s 
nonspecific invocations of risks to the peace process. And finally, given 
the guarded nature of the SOI, we see no “embarrassment” that would 
follow from fulfilling our independent duty to determine whether the 
case should proceed. We are mindful of Sosa’s instruction to give “se-
rious weight” to the views of the executive, but we cannot uphold the 
dismissal of this lawsuit solely on the basis of the SOI.266 
The Ninth Circuit granted a hearing en banc, but at that point the PNG 
government had reversed its position on the litigation and the State De-
partment informed the court that it no longer sought dismissal based on 
the foreign policy concerns expressed in its earlier letter.267 
11. Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co. Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250 
(N.D. Ala. 2003) 
In a case alleging that a U.S.-based company was legally liable for the 
murders of Colombian union members by Colombian paramilitary 
groups, the court asked the State Department whether the executive 
branch was aware of the pending litigation and whether it had made a 
decision not to intervene.268 The Department of State replied that it was 
aware of the case, but “does not routinely involve itself in district court 
cases to which the United States is not a party,” so that “no inference 
should be drawn about the Department’s views regarding a particular 
case in which it has not participated, or as to questions which it has not 
addressed.”269 The submission then states that the Department “does not 
have an opinion at this time as to whether continued adjudication of this 
matter will have an adverse impact on the foreign policy interest of the 
United States.”270 The letter then notes its interpretation of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Sosa that narrowed the applicability of the ATS in 
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several cases; the letter was forwarded to the court by the Department of 
Justice, which reiterated those concerns and attached a copy of the brief 
the department filed in the Khulumani case.271 
The court entered judgment for the defendants after a jury trial.272 An 
appeal is pending. 
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